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INTRODUCTION
The cost of shipping by ocean vessels influence the
amount of heavy grain^ exports from the United States to
world markets. Rate differentials affect the competitive
positions of various ports as shipping points and the inter
regional competition between and among ports. Rates also
affect the competitive position of the producing areas trib
utary to the ports. In addition, rates associated with the
transportation of heavy grain have been important factors in
determining the routes over which grain was shipped- For
example, the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway greatly
enhanced the competitive position of the Great Lakes region-
Ocean freight rates combined with domestic prices
determine the competitive position of United States grains
in the world market. Domestic prices for heavy grains have
been subject to Government support programs which usually
raise the price well above world market prices. To enable
grain to enter the international market, the Government some
times has paid a fee to the grain exporter about equal to the
difference between the domestic market price and the inter
national grain price. The intention of the above program
Heavy grain? wheat, corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum.
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Furgeson, Walter. United States Department of Agricul
ture, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Des
Moines, Iowa. Information on export payments. Private com
munication. 1959.
has been to make United States grain prices competitive with
other exporting countries. With competitive domestic grain
prices# the country that could deliver to the buyer the
cheapest, made the sale. In this particular case, the cost
of ocean shipping often determined who got the sale.
The United States merchant marine has been composed of
archaic, obsolete vessels of World War II vintage (13), It
cannot compete with foreign-flag vessels unless subsidized
because of high shipbuilding, labor, and operating costs (6).
The entire United States-flag fleet has been subsidized.
One portion receiving a direct subsidy, the other portion
receiving an indirect subsidy in the form of an unusually
high rate, per ton of commodity shipped.
PURPOSE
Ocean shipping of heavy grain is a complex and com
petitive industry influenced by domestic and international
events, both political and economic in nature. The industry
has been affected by wars, famines, droughts, economic
crises, government policies, natural disasters and more.
The purpose of the present study is to serve as an in
troduction to this complex industry. Institutional arrange
ments in the ocean shipping industry have been surveyed and
reported. Specifically studied were the conference system,
charter parties, the world fleet, the United States fleet,
factors influencing supply and demand for vessels, factors
affecting the level of freight rates, and how the above
factors influence the rate level associated with the trans
portation of heavy grain shipped via voyage chartered tramp
vessels.
Data on ocean shipments of heavy grains shipped via
voyage chartered tramp vessels were collected and analyzed-
It was necessary to limit the scope of the study to the four
major exporting ranges and their major grain exporting ports.
Destinations were limited to the major importing areas
receiving United States heavy grain.
Heavy grain export data from United States ports for
1958, 1966 and 1967 were used to evaluate the importance of
each port region, the changes and trends that have taken
place/ as well as future trends and developments.
An analysis of heavy grain freight rates was made to
show the fluctuations that occur in such rates. An analysis
of the relationship between the average monthly freight rates
for ten years in two trade routes and a short list of world
(
events was made to indicate the influence on freight rates
by both political and economic events.
An analysis of charter options also was conducted. The
results of this analysis were used as an indicator to some
of the basic cost differences between different port regions
and destinations.
Stated briefly, the purposes of the study was to make
a comprehensive exploration of the ocean shipping industry,
develop background information concerning grain shipments,
analyze the factors influencing the general overall level
of rates, analyze a sample of ocean shipments of heavy grains
shipped via voyage chartered tramp vessels, and determine
some differences in rates for different trade routes.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
History o£ United States Fleet Policy
The United States Merchant Marine is heavily dependent
on the present subsidy program. Subsidy for the Merchant
Marine is not new; as early as 1789 the United States began
a program of indirect subsidy and since that date has tried,
unsuccessfully, many direct and indirect subsidy programs to
promote the Merchant Marine,
Numerous reasons have been advanced as to why a nation
should develop its maritime industries by means of protective
policies. Three arguments seem to justify a reasonable
amount of aid (21) . First, national defense may be promoted
by its maintenance, under national registry for use as fleet
supply ships in war time and also of sufficient freighter
tonnage to insure sea-borne trade against a breakdown, should
a number of foreign ships be withdrawn from the United States
trade. Second, sea-borne trade should be protected against
interruption and unfair discrimination or competition in
foreign markets as a result of the interference of foreign
governments. Third, there has been a high degree of imper
fect competition in sections of the shipping business, a
large amount of government support, and the existence of
considerable economies of scale.
Three general types of policy have been distinguished
for the protection of a maritime induestry (21). First, navi«
gation monopolies were used to eliminate some or all foreign
shipping, alter trade routes, raise freight rates and promote
expansion in the shipping industry. Second, subsidies may be
used to expand national shipping activity on certain routes.
Subsidies may be of many forms, such as mail contracts, low
interest loans, sale of vessels at low prices, government
contracts, operation cost reduction and construction cost
reduction, to mention a few of the more popular. Third,
registry policies control the supply of vessels to national
owners by determining what ships shall be eligible for reg
istry or subsidy. To date, most policies have been oppor
tunistic and highly unstable, and have had little balance
between aims and costs (21).
The United States has tried many types of policies, yet
none have been completely successful. In 1789, Congress
passed a bill that granted a 10 percent discount of customs
duties on all imports brought into American ports by American
ships. By 1794, U.S. vessels carried 91 percent of the im
ports and 96.5 percent of the exports whereas they carried
only 17 percent of the imports and 30.5 percent of the ex
ports in 1789 (22). The 10 percent discount of customs
duties was discontinued after the War of 1812.
In 1945, Congress passed its first ship subsidy bill,
with the subsidy being a mail subsidy. In 1847, Congress
provided that all ship's benefiting by the mail subsidy should
be subject to the purchase and control of the Government
whenever necessity required. From 1845 until 1936# mail
subsidy was the dominant form of subsidy, although it varied
in magnitude from time to time.
In 1916, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of
1916 (26) which created a Shipping Board composed of five
members with the authority to organize corporations for the
construction, purchase, charter and operation of ships, and
with capital stocX not to exceed $50,000,000 (22)- Three
thousand (22) ships were built in all, mainly during the
war and since they were built for speed of construction,
they were not of the most modern design.
The Act (26) also prohibited rebates on freight rates,
use of fighting ships for the purpose of reducing competi
tion, retaliation against a shipper by refusing space or
other discrimination, and discriminatory contracts with any
shipper based on the volume of freight offered (26, Sec. 14).
At the close of World War I, the United States had
acquired an over-supply of ships, mostly Government owned.
As a solution to the over-supply problem. Congress passed
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (27), The purpose of the
Act of 1920 (27) was to enable the Shipping Board to operate
the ships until such time as they could be sold.
The Board was also authorized to determine what steam-
8ship lines should be established and put in operation from
ports in the United States {21, Sec, 7)- If service was
determined to be necessary, the Board had the power to charter
vessels to any United States Citizen that could qualify.
A construction loan fund was also to be set up out of
the revenue from sales and operations, the sum not to exceed
$25,000,000. The fund was to be used in aid of the construc
tion of vessels of the best and most efficient type. Aid was
limited to two-thirds the cost of the construction of the
vessel (27, Sec. 11).
On May 22, 1928, Congress amended the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 (27) by increasing the construction loan fund to
$125,000,000 (28, Sec. 301(a)) and increasing the amount
that the Government might lend from two-thirds of the cost
of the ship, as provided in the Act of 1920 (27), to 75 per
cent (28, Sec. 302(e))- It also provided for a definite
scale of ocean mail subsidies with rates varying according
to the size and speed of the vessel (28, Sec. 409(a)).
In essence, the Act (28) was an attempt to subsidize
the shipping industry through the use of mail contracts.
The Postmaster General was to certify to the Shipping Board
what ocean mail routes should be established for the carry
ing of mails. It was then the Shipping Board's responsibil
ity to determine the type, size, speed, and other character
istics of the vessel which should be employed on each route.
the frequency and regularity of their sailings (28, Sec. 403).
The vessels employed on these routes must be American-built
and registered under the laws of the United States (28, Sec.
405) .
The Act (28) also carried defense provisions. Any ves
sel could be taken and purchased or used by the United States
if the vessel was under contract from the construction
loan fund or if it was under ocean mail contract (28,
Sec- 702(a)) ..
In 1933, President Roosevelt transferred all functions
of the Shipping Board to the Department of Commerce.
The Act of 1928 (28) failed to provide for an adequate
merchant marine. Despite the expenditure of considerable
siams, there was a decline in the position of American
shipping in foreign trade. In terms of cargo tons of exports
and imports, American ships carried in the trans-Atlantic
trades, 22 percent in 1928 and 23 percent in 1935, but in
the trans-Pacific trades, 29 and 20 percent in the same years
respectively. Between 1928 and 1935 there had been but eight
cargo ships built in the United States, compared with 853 in
Great Britain (21). The result was the passage by Congress
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (29) .
The general outline of the new policy calls for dif
ferential subsidies for both shipping and ship building for
vessels operating in approved trade routes. Ships built
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under the Act (29) may be sold# chartered or operated.
Private owners operating under subsidy are rigidly regulated
concerning earnings, salaries, finances, wage rates, sub
sistence, and manning scales (21), The Act (29) also es
tablishes the Maritime Commission, composed of five members
appointed by the President.
The objectives of this Act can be quoted from Section
101 of the Act (29, Sec. 101).
It is necessary for the national defence and develop
ment of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine (a) suf
ficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export
and import foreign commerce of the United States
and to provide shipping service on all routes es
sential for maintaining the flow of such domestic
and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b)
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and
operated under the United States flag by citizens
of the United States in so far as may be practicable,
and (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and
most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the
United States and manned with a trained and ef
ficient citizen personnel.
The Commission was also authorized to investigate and
keep records of ocean services; routes; the number of sail
ings; type, size, speed of vessels employed; American con
struction costs versus foreign construction costs; American
versus foreign operating expense; and amounts of aid by
foreign governments to their merchant fleets,
A construction-differential subsidy is available to
aid in the construction of a new vessel, if it is to be
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used on a service, route, or line in the foreign commerce of
the United States and has been determined to be essential (29,
Sec. 501). Plans for such a vessel has to be approved by the
Navy Department to judge the feasibility of adoption for de
fense. The construction-differential is not to exceed 50
percent (29, Sec. 502) of the construction cost of the ves
sel, which must be constructed in shipyards within the United
States (29, Sec- 502). The ship owner is required to pay
25 percent of the construction cost in cash and the balance
within 20 years at 3-5 percent interest per annum (29, Sec.
502) .
Any citizen of the United States could also apply for
financial aid in the operations of vessels which is to be
used in an essential service in the foreign commerce of th^
United States, Aid will not be approved unless (29, Sec.
601) :
1- The operation of the vessel in service, route, or
line is required to meet foreign-flag competition
and to promote the foreign commerce of the United
States and the vessel must be built in the U.S.
2. The aid applied for must be necessary to place the
proposed operations of the vessel on a parity with
those of foreign competitors.
A contractor under operating-differential subsidy is
also limited on his profits. At the end of any 5—year period
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during which an operating-differential subsidy is paid,
if his net profit on his subsidized vessel exceeds 10 percent
per annum on his capital investment, the contractor must pay
to the United States an amount equal to one-half of his prof
its in excess of 10 percent per annum (29, Sec. 606).
The contractor must also create out of gross earnings a
Capital Reserve Fund. The contractor must deposit an amount
equal to the annual depreciation charges on the contractor's
vessel on which the operating differential was being paid.
He must also put in a specified amount of earnings which ex
ceed 10 percent profit; the amount is set by the Commission
(29, Sec- 607).
The contractor must also create a special reserve fund
in which he must deposit annually the profits earned by the
business in excess of 10 percent per annum and in excess of
the amount deposited in the Capital Reserve Fund. The only
disbursements allowed from this fund is to reimburse the
contractor's general funds for current operating losses (29,
Sec- 607(c)), All earnings deposited in the contractor's
reserye fund are exempt from all Federal Taxes except earn
ings withdrawn and paid into the contractor's general funds
or distributed as dividends or bonuses (29, Sec- 607(f))-
If the private sector fails to offer a service that the
Commission deems necessary, the Commission may have vessels
constructed to carry out the objectives of the Act (29, Sec.
13
702), It may then charter or offer for sale these vessels
acquired by the Commission. A charterer of such a vessel
must pay back one-half of the profits over 10 percent net
profit (29, Sec. 709(a)). The charter is a bareboat char
ter^ and the charterer is required to use United States
officers and employees.
For defense/ in time of national emergency, the Com
mission has the power to requisition any vessel documented
under the laws of the United States (29, Sec. 901).
The purpose of the Act (29) was to provide for a mer
chant marine sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne
commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne ex
ports and import trade. Before any results from the Act
(29) could be distinguished, war disrupted the maritime in
dustry. A massive ship-building program was followed during
the course of the war with the end results that a large num
ber of ships were in Government ownership at the conclusion
of the war. As a result, the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946
(30) was passed to transfer Government owned vessels into
private ownership to form a merchant marine adequate to meet
the needs of American commerce and defense. A price formula
was adopted, consisting of 50 percent of the prewar domestic
Bareboat charter: the owner completely relinquishes
control of the vessel to the charterer, who bears the ex
pense of operation during the period of the charter.
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cost for each class of vessel, adjusted for (30, Sec. 3):
1. Normal annual depreciation at 5 percent plus war
service depreciation at 3 percent.
2. Allowances to bring ships up to standard conditions.
3. Adjustments for special features.
The Act (30) also provided for sale of vessels to non-
citizens, with preference to United States citizens (30,
Sec. 7).
The direct results of this Act (30) were:
1. The fleets of the liner companies in the United
States foreign trade were filled with a large num
ber of the best cargo ships.
2. Tramp ship operators were reluctant to buy, but
those that did, bought the slower, cheaper vessels
3. It provided the opportunity for many foreign
countries to enlarge their war depleted merchant
marine.
Following the conclusion of the Korean War, a major
piece of legislation was passed in an attempt to help the
again, oversupplied maritime industry. The Cargo Preference
Act of 1954 (25) stated that 50 percent of Government-spon-
sored shipments must be carried in the United States bottoms
if available at a fair and reasonable rate. This was the
only major legislation passed that was applicable to tramp
vessels as well as liners.
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The results of legislation to provide the United States
with a modern efficient fleet have been unsuccessful- In
1965, only 9 percent of this country's foreign trade traveled
under its own flag, compared with 50 percent as recently as
1950. Operating subsidies have more than quadrupled to over
$200 million annually (5).
The construction-differential subsidy may also be termed
a failure. In 1965, a scant 7 percent of the volume of com
mercial shipyards were merchant vessels. The subsidy dollar
buys so little tonnage that over 90 ships of the subsidized
lines are over-due for replacement (5).
The maritime program still is controlled by the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 (29). At that time, bulk carriage in
United States foreign trade was practically non-existent and
the Act (29) was intended to subsidize the construction and
operation of liners. Chiefly, because of the Cargo Preference
Act of 1954 (25) and the agriculture disposal program, we
have a tramp fleet today. Eighty-five percent of foreign
trade tonnage in 1965 took the form of such dry bulk car
riage as wheat. As a result, the 1936 Act (29), now covers
ships which handle less than 5 percent of the total (5).
At present, $100 million per year is spent on cargo
preference freight-rate differentials. Preference cargo
accounted for 61 percent of the total tonnage carried by the
United States Merchant Marine in 1963. In bulk carriers, it
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accounted for 87 percent- Seventy-two percent of the total
export cargo by United States tramps and tankers in 1963 was
preference cargo moving under P. L. 480 (19).
Nicholas Johnson, head of the Federal Maritime Cominis-
sion sums up the success of the Cargo Preference Act of 1954
(25# 19): "as a subsidy, direct or indirect, cargo pref
erence has been a miserable failure: not a single new tramp
ship has been built since 1956, and the cost of keeping the
old ones in existence climbs higher and higherThe tramp
fleet is composed of about 130 vessels. Only seven of these
ships were built since World War II."
Shipping Conferences
Liners accounted for 22,1 percent of the United States
heavy grain exports in 1958 but only five percent of the
heavy grain exports in 1966 (4). Shipments of heavy grain
via liner have not been of any great significance in recent
years due to the competitive advantage that other types of
carriers possess in freight rates.
Cargo liners publish rates for manufactured goods and
for small quantities of bulk commodities- The rates for
large quantities of bulk commodities are determined by ne
gotiation. These carriers offer a regular service for a
predetermined trade route.
Most liners are members of conferences which were
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legalized by the Shipping Act of 1916 (26) under the con
dition that they file their articles of agreement with the,
now/ Federal Maritime Board (12).
A shipping conference is an unincorporated association
of mutually competitive liner operators, maintained for the
purposes of (7):
1. controlling competition among its members and
2- strengthening the members# through cooperative
action, in their competitive fight against non-
member carriers.
Membership is voluntary and one may withdraw from membership
upon giving notice of withdrawal after a specified waiting
period.^
Conference members perform the major portion of berth
or liner service in world trade. In many trades there are
no independent (i.e. nonmember) liner operators (7). At the
present time there are approximately 110 conferences in the
ocean trade of the United States (2). Any liner operator may
belong to more than one conference, with one being a member
of 21 conferences (7).
The two main advantages provided by conferences are that
they provide rate stability and regularity of sailings. The
rate stability eliminates the unpredictability that is
^The Shipping Act of 1916 (26) specifies from 30 to 90
days.
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associated with unregulated rates. Stable rates are an es
sential part of the process of pricing a commodity in the
export markets- The regularity of sailings provides the
opportunity for an exporter to plan his shipments for the
future.
Two disadvantages can be associated with the conference
system. One is the elimination of competition and the second
one is the exclusive patronage arrangement-^ Critics of the
system feel that the level of ocean freight rates is probably
higher than it would be if the forces of competition were
freely at play (2). The exclusive patronage arrangement is
presently in the form of dual rates in the United States and
deferred rebating in foreign countries. Many critics of
the system feel this is a discrimatory act and is therefore
unlawful (7).
The dual rate which is present in the United States
trade is a contractual arrangement whereby an exporter, in
exchange for committing 100 percent (11) of his shipments to
the vessels of a given conference, is granted a rate that may
Exclusive patronage: the shipper signs an agreement
where he promises to patronize conference members and not
patronize nonmembers, that is for the trade covered by the
conference and in return the shipper gets a lower rate.
2
Deferred rebates: a return of any portion of the
freight money for exclusive patronage.
19
be as much as 15 percent below the published tariff rate
that applies to exporters who do not sign exclusive patron
age contracts (2).
The main provisions of the dual rate contract are that
the shipper will offer to the steamship lines composing the
conference, 100 percent of the cargo that he has for ship
ment in the trade covered and if the shipper deliberately
breaks the contract by shipping cargo on a steamship line
that is not a member of the conference, he loses his stand
ing as a contractor.
The controversy over the dual rate contract lies not
with the shippers who sign the contract (who have the choice
of signing or not signing) but in the effects these contracts
have on the independent lines. Isbrandtsen, an American flag
shipping company that, until recently, had not been associated
with any conference, claimed that the dual rate system damages
the competitive position of the independent in trades where
it exists (7). In a 1958 ruling on a suit brought against
the conferences by Isbrandtsen Lines, the Supreme Court de
cided that the dual rate system was integral to current con
ferences operations- As such it should be immune from United
States antitrust laws (15).
Acting on this decision. Congress passed the Bonner Act
of 1961 amending the 1915 Shipping Act (26). The Bonner Act
legalized the dual rate system, it included a series of
20
stipulations that contracts had to meet- The Federal Mari
time Commission was given the tasTc of policing the rules
(15) .
Regulatory Agencies
The Shipping Act of 1916 (26) established the United
States Shipping Board, a Federal agency whose powers included
the regulatory functions set forth in the Act. In 1933, the
Shipping Board was abolished and its powers transferred to
the Secretary of Commerce, and a subdivision, called the
United States Shipping Board Bureau, was established within
the Department of Commerce. In 1936, a new agency, the
United States Maritime Commission, inherited those powers.
In 1950, the Maritime Commission was dissolved and its func
tions were transferred to two new agencies; the Federal
Maritime Board and the Maritime Administration.
The two new bodies, although technically distinct,
maintained joint operation of officers and employees as a
single body of personnel, and the chairman of the Federal
Maritime Board also served as head of the Maritime Adminis
tration. The Board determined and awarded subsidies and
exercised the regulatory powers over carriers in foreign
commerce. The Maritime Administration performed the func
tions previously vested in the Maritime Commission, such as
specification of essential trade routes, supervision of ship
21
construction# and maintenance of the reserve fleet (13).
In 1961/ the Federal Maritime Board was abolished and
its functions were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce-
The Secretary of Commerce in turn delegated these tasXs to a
Maritime Administrator and to a newly created Maritime Sub
sidy Board/ which is subject to review by the Secretary of
Commerce. The regulatory functions were given to the Federal
Maritime Commission.
The duties of the Commission are mainly concerned with
firms who are members of conferences and engaged in foreign
trade on essential trade routes. The Commission has the
authority to disapprove any rate which it finds to be so high
or low that it is detrimental to the commerce of the United
States. It is also required to maintain a record of all
tariffs in which it is involved. All dual rate contracts
must be approved by it and available to all shippers. Also,
all anti-competitive agreements must be filed and approved
by the Commission. It is also authorized to investigate any
discriminatory practices.
As one can readily see, maritime regulatory agencies
have been subject to many changes within the last fifty
years. It appears that the cause of the changes was
the dissatisfaction associated with the relative position of
the United States fleet and it is an attempt by the Govern
ment to rectify the problem through changes at the administra-
22
tive level.
Charter Parties and General Charter Provisions
Ocean carriers offering irregular service with no fixed
ports-of-call are known as tramps or tramp steamers. Grain/
coal, and other bulk commodities are their chief cargoes.
Their rates are determined by negotiation between the shipper
and the carrier, with a ship broker serving as the go-between,
The agreement that results from these negotiations is called
a charter party. Charter parties are documents which form
the contracts between the ships owners, or his agent, and
the charterer, the man who leases the ship.
There are three basic charter parties (8)7 the bareboat,
time, and voyage charters. Bareboat charters are the least
used type of charter. Many experts class this charter as
"Government type charter" because its use is usually as
sociated with Government charters. The charterer functions
as the ship owner and must man and provision the ship and
perform the other related functions of a ship owner. The
length of time associated with such a charter party depends
on the individual charter party but usually is for at least
one year.
Voyage charters are made for a certain voyage or series
of voyages. In such a charter, the owner usually bears all
the expenses of the voyage—or the charterer may be required
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by the agreement to pay certain of the expenses relating to
port or terminal activities.
Under time charters the vessel under contract becomes
the possession of the charterer for a stipulated period of
time, with the usual arrangement being that the owner of the
ship supplies the crew* their food and maintenance, and keeps
the ship in repair, while the charterer furnishes the fuel
and pays the port and terminal charges.
The following discussion will omit bareboat charters
and cover time and voyage charters exclusively. At the present
time bareboat charters are seldom used.
There are two main sources of charters; the Chamber of
Shipping of the United Kingdom and the New York Produce Ex
change. The provisions of the Chamber of Shipping of the
United Kingdom and the New York Produce Exchange are almost
identical with respect to the division of the expense burden
between owner and charterer. The Chamber of Shipping's Bal-
time form, used much abroad, tends to be more favorable to
the owner and less favorable to the charterer than the Produce
Exchange's, Most United States charterers use the New York
Produce Exchange's, The following discussion will be limited
to it.
The provisions of time and voyage charters both state
the vessels net tonnage. The time charter goes into greater
detail: it states deadweight tonnage, horse power, speed,
and rate of fuel consumption. Both charters have provisions
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as to the sea worthiness of the vessel.
Voyage charters also indicate the ports from and to which
they apply. A time charter generally contains much broader
provisions as to ports to be served than does a voyage char
ter; it ordinarily indicates only a few areas not to be
served such as a war zone for which the crews may demand
bonuses.
Earliest date and latest date by which the vessel is to
be ready for loading are usually set- Also usually given
are the lay days.^ Under either type of charter, the char
terer is generally given the option to cancel if the owner
fails to furnish the vessel on time.
Liens are also established by charter provisions. The
charterer is given a lien against the ship for payments made
by the charterer that are in excess of what the owner has
earned under provisions of the Produce Exchange form. A
lien is also established for the owner on cargoes for an
amount equal to the value of the charter party. In the case
of voyage charters, this lien is important to the owner be
cause of the cesser clause, which states that the charterer's
liability shall cease upon shipment or completion of loading
of the cargo (7).
In a time charter, the freight rate is usually stated as so much
^Lay days: time allowed for loading or unloading.
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per dead-weight ton per month- The vessels capacity is not
merely the cargo-carrying capacity but the total, including
the capacity used for fuel and stores.
In most voyage charters, the rate is stated as so much
per cargo unit. The quantity of cargo to be shipped is gen
erally stipulated in the charter. The usual practice with
respect to various commodities is to state in the charter
a range of weights, within which the owner may select the
weight of the cargo to be carried. If he ships less, he
must pay the rate for the lowest weight in the range-
Occasionally, a lump sum is agreed upon as the freight
charge. Stipulation of a lump sum may reflect efforts on
the part of the charterer or the owner or a broker for one
of them, to outwit the other party.
For voyage charters, the port of loading and unloading
may be quoted for a range which may include numerous ports.
Exporters will try to obtain the broadest possible range of
options regarding ports of loading and unloading within a
coastal zone. The relative bargaining power of the parties
at any particular moment determines how much flexibility
will be conceded to the operators, although normal usage
sets some limits on the range within which this bargaining
operates (14). A big shipper may also try to reserve him
self the right to declare the port of unloading only after
a more or less lengthy time during which he may await market
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developments after the merchandise has already been loaded-
Voyage charters also state the lay days or time allowed
to the charterer for either loading or unloading. A subtle
form of discount may be provided in connection with lay days,
The number of days allowed for loading and unloading is us
ually quoted. If the charterer fails to complete either
within the lay days, he pays an additional fee called a
demurrage. But if the vessel is loaded or unloaded in a
shorter time than specified, the charterer usually receives
what is called dispatch money. By agreeing on an unusually
high number of lay days, the parties can virtually eliminate
the possibility of demurrage and can make the payment of
dispatch money almost inevitable (7).
Customary procedure in chartering of an ocean vessel
for one voyage is to state who must pay for the loading and
unloading of the vessel. This is especially true in the
grain trade. "Gross terms" specifies that the ship operator
must pay for both the loading and unloading of the vessel.
The expression "free discharge" means that the cargo will be
unloaded at destination free of expense to shipowners- The
expression, "free in and out" means that the shipowner is
not responsible for the expense of loading or unloading.
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Description of the World Fleet
World fleet developanents since World War II can be clas
sified into three general areas (13). First, there has been
a trend towards increased government involvement. This in
volvement may be in the form of ownership of vessels and/or
special privileges and discriminatory practices for the
national flag fleet. Second, the number of nations that
have national flag fleets have increased. The third area
was the emergence of flags of convenience.
In 1949, 46 nations had a national fleet, in 1963 the
number of nations with national flag fleets had increased to
66 countries.^ Of the 20 new national flag fleets organized,
at least half were initially financed and continued to be
largely controlled by government. The relative concentra
tion has also changed. In 1949, eighty-five percent of the
world's tonnage was concentrated under a dozen flags, where
as in 1963 the same nations controlled 70 percent. The size
of the world's fleet has doubled in terms of tonnage since
its peak prewar year which was 1929 (13).
Government subsidy is not an uncommon phenomena with
respect to the world fleet. The United States, France, and
Italy provide direct subsidy payments to their national
National flag fleet: any nation with five or more ocean
going vessels, 1000 gross tons or over (13).
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fleet. Other countries such as Australia, Canada, India,
Japan, Spain and Yugoslavia provide indirect subsidies of
various types. The subsidy may be in the form of a special
tax program, loans at low interest rates, depreciation of
140 percent of the purchase cost as used in Great Britain,
or a subsidy to the scrap market to encourage the scrapping
of obsolete vessels as used in West Germany. The world
merchant marine is not a truly competitive industry (13).
Discrimination towards one's own flag is also a common
phenomena. The principle form of preference is to permit
shipment of certain cargoes on national flag vessels only.
The extent of government discriminatory activities is hard
to determine- It has been estimated that less than 5 per
cent^ of the world's ocean commerce is shipped under dis
criminatory practices (13).
The United States-flag fleet must compete with foreign-
flag vessels for most cargoes. The foreign-flag fleet may
be divided into two distinct flags; the national flag ves
sels and the flags of convenience vessels. The latter will
be discussed in detail later.
^Based on 1957 data (13) -
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Description of the United States Fleet
The United States-flag fleet size has been influenced in
the past half century principally by the massive shipbuilding
programs associated with World Wars I and II. As a result,
the fleetls tonnage has fluctuated greatly in the last fifty
or so years. World War I left the United States with a
fleet five times larger than the prewar fleet and more than
half of this was owned by the Government, This fleet ac
counted for 22 percent of the world fleet (13).
Approximately twenty-five years later the United States
faced the same problem, this time a result of the shipbuild
ing programs of the Second World War. At the close of the
war the United States owned 60 percent of the world's tonnage
as compared to 14 percent in 1940. With the passage of the
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 (30), the United States fleet
was reduced to 36.4 percent of the world's fleet in 1948.
As of 1962, United States fleet tonnage had dwindled to 8.7
percent of the active world fleet (13).
The United States Merchant Marine carried only 8 percent
of United States imports and exports in 1966 (23). Through
out the past fifty years, the percentage of United States
cargo carried on United States-flag vessels has varied
closely with the size of our fleet. From 1904 to 1914, an
average of 10 percent of America's foreign commerce were
carried on its own flag vessels (36). Around 1930, one-third
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(36) was carried and five years later it had climbed to 35
percent (35).
The United States fleet is composed of two separate
competitive fleets; the subsidized fleet and non-subsidized
fleet.^ The subsidized fleet is in the more favorable posi
tion due to its favorable tax position and capital structure
They were able to multiply their net worth by five between
1937 and 1946? the non-subsidized only doubled their equity
(13).
Since 1948 the margin between the "haves" and "have-
nots" of the industry has widened- The net worth of the
subsidized companies has again more than doubled. The
assets of the remainder of the dry cargo sector of the in
dustry in contrast have probably declined. The niomber of
freighters enrolled in the subsidy program# however, has
increased only slightly, from 250 in 1948 to 287 in 1963.
During the same period, non-subsidized companies have suf
fered a net loss of roughly 250 ships through transfers,
scrappings, and losses at sea (13).
From 1946 through the mid-point of the Korean War
(1952), subsidized operators earned (after recapture and
taxes) an average of 12.6 percent of their net worth; non-
Non-subsidized refers to no direct subsidy. The non-
subsidized fleet may receive indirect subsidy such as an
unusually high freight rate.
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subsidized lines reporting to the Maritime Administration
earned 6 percent (13).
During the next five years, earnings for both groups
were lower but still reasonably adequate. However, because
of the 1958 break in the shipping market, lack of earnings
plunged most non-subsidized lines into a loss position,
while the subsidized group, although also seriously affected,
continued to show some return on net worth, averaging 4.6
percent from 1958 through 1962 inclusive (13).
The current financial position of the United States-flag
vessels operating outside the direct subsidy program cannot
be assessed with any degree of confidence. Public reports
are filed only by carriers holding Government-financed ship
mortgages or operating in a regulated domestic trade. On
the highly volatile and speculative tramp industry, there
is no reliable or comprehensive information available. Al
though the tramp group claims heavy losses on current income
and expense losses, the frequent transfers in corporate
ownership of their ships suggests that the business has been
geared to maximizing tax-free cash flow from depreciation
and to taking capital gains on ship sales. In order to
limit liability, independent shipowners have often organized
separate corporations for each ship.
New equity capital for subsidized companies from 1936
through 1962 totaled only $16 million, excluding $12 million
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of stocks issued in exchange for vessels. All but $4 mil
lion of the cash subscription occurred prior to World War
II (13). In contrast to the subsidized companies, non-sub
sidized shipping has attracted a significant amount of risk
capital, much of it frankly speculative. Nonetheless, it
is ironic that this sector of the industry should have at
tracted more investor attention than the companies partici
pating in a program intended to enhance their investment
status.
A strong financial position coupled with construction
subsidies and mortgages guarantees has permitted the sub
sidized companies to acquire some of the world's finest dry
cargo liners and to undertake a systematic program for re
placement of their fleets. In contrast, there is no program
at all for replacement of the war-built freighters operated
outside the subsidy program and no likelihood within the
framework of the present subsidy program that one can be
arranged. Since World War II only five new dry cargo ves
sels have been built for non-subsidized service. Whereas,
43 percent of the ships operated by subsidized companies
as of December 31, 1964, had been constructed since World
War II (13) ,
Maritime labor unions have had a great influence on the
United States-flag fleet. According to one author (13),
these unions have alienated customers, pushed up costs.
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retarded introduction of new technology, undermined public
confidence/ discouraged investment^ and contributed to the
contraction of the United States-flag fleet.
Abetted by the stimulus of subsidies, shipboard wages
have risen to a level well above the wages for jobs other
wise available to seamen. Job rationing has been practiced
by certain maritime unions for many years- Seventy-two per
cent of a seamanb wage was paid out of tax dollars. With
maritime wages always increasing, the wage subsidies have
increased from $40 million in 1950 to $177 million in 1954.
Productivity has increased only slightly (20).
Crew size for newly automated freighters has been re
duced from 50 to 35, but many experts feel that these ves
sels could be automated to the point where a crew of only
12 would be required. The struggle for more automation will
not be easy. The Maritime Commission will have to fight the
shipbuilders and the shipping companies plus the longshore
men's unions and the seamen's unions. These unions possess
the power to tie-up the nation's foreign trade (20).
Furthermore, unions have not readily accepted new cargo
handling techniques or new innovations as readily as they
could. Nearly 60 percent of our freight bill when shipping
abroad is incurred within a few miles of the i>ort area. One
method of reducing our freight bill then is to reduce these
costs by improved cargo handling methods and modernizing our
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ports (20).
One of the main goals of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 (29) was the maintenance of a United States-flag fleet
to serve as a military auxiliary in time of national emer
gency. Since the act was only applicable to vessels engaged
in foreign trade on essential trade routes, the liner should
be the vessel that fulfills this role as a military auxiliary
It now appears that the non-subsidized vessel is the one who
must adjust to the needs of the military.
Today's vessels are becoming more and more specialized
and there is a general feeling that they are not applicable
to military operations. Many of today's fleet, because of
their size cannot enter a number of the world's ports. Also,
many of the vessels that have been built in the last ten
years have been built without military features as required
under the Act of 1936 (29).
The time involved in getting the United States-flag
fleet home is also another factor to consider. Three months
must be allotted for this purpose. It therefore appears
that the military must rely on the obsolete reserve fleet
and the flexibility of the tramp fleet for fulfillment of
emergency needs•
There are many disappointing aspects of the United
States fleet. There has been a persistent decline from their
wartime peaks in the niimber of United States registered ships,
35
One major disappointment is the apparent disorganization of
our tramp fleet which handles much of our bulk cargoes and
for which the military must rely on as an auxiliary fleet.
The reserve fleet also is in a state of slow physical de
terioration.
The subsidized sector of the fleet operates the best
ships, enjoy the best earnings and reserve funds and are
protected from competition through membership in conferences
and through the Maritime Administrations surveillance of
essential trade routes.
The non-subsidized sector is operating war-built equip
ment on a narrow margin of profits. Its future is tied very
closely to the unpredictable shipping requirements of the
Government's foreign aid agencies. The sector of the fleet
which carries the main portion of the United States commerce
shipped on United States vessels and is our military's
auxiliary fleet has no assistance in replacing the obsolete
equipment or operating subsidy to help overcome the high
cost of operations and high wage rates.
A comparison of the United States-flag vessels with a
foreign nation's is rather difficult because of differing
accounting procedures. The two best indicators not ap
preciably affected by differing accounting methods and
capital structures are cash flow and dividend distribution
achieved per ship (13).
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For the period 1958-61 inclusive, the fifteen United
States subsidized lines^ reported an average net cash flow
of $79.6 million annually or $230,000 per ship per year.
After tax earnings were $125,000 per ship, and dividends
$50,000 per ship. During the same period, eight major
European lines owning 780 vessels averaged a cash flow of
only $127,000, earnings of $21,000 and dividends of $13,400
per ship (13).
Flags of Convenience
International competition in merchant shipping has been
further complicated by the emergence of flags of convenience.
Flags of convenience are registries offered by nations with
few requirements for merchant shipping and who are willing
to register foreign owned vessels as their own for only a
minimum fee and taxes and few restrictions.
Flags of convenience emerged around 1939 when the United
States was following a neutrality policy but wished to help
her allies with shipments of supplies. There are three main
flags of convenience (PANLIBHON); Panamanian, Liberian, and
Honduran. Recently Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia have
readily accepted foreign owned vessels for registry.
Figures are not available for a comparison of our non-
subsidized sector of the fleet.
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With the sale of United States surplus ships, follow
ing World War II, flags of convenience registries swelled
in late 1949 and early 1950. Between 1950 and 1963 the
deadweight tonnage multiplied by four, growing from 5.7 to
12-8 percent of the active world fleet (13).
Flags of convenience have been most attractive to
American shipowners, for whom they provide a refuge from
the world's highest seafaring wages and also offer the
option of shipbuilding in foreign countries which are much
lower in cost than American shipyards. As of January, 1963,
it was thought that 45-50 percent of the tonnage was owned
by Americans (13).
Despite its distinct advantages, PANLIBHOW and other
flags of convenience suffer certain disadvantages. The most
important is the lacX of national flag patronage and pref
erences. AS a consequence# flags of convenience have been
used for services in which national flag allegiance is
relatively unimportant- They also face an uncertain status
in international law and lack any effective government pro
tection, which can lead to inconvenience and embarrassment
during periods of international tensions. They are bitterly
opposed by international labor.
These foreign registries have created an important
source of competition for United States foreign trade
cargoes and for United States investment-
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Siunmary
At no time since 1947 "has the United States-flag
merchant marine carried as much as 50 percent of the
total dry cargo tonnage of the United States foreign
trade, the implied objective of the 1936 Act (29). The
Government has not even attempted to win a substantial
segment of the private bulk cargo or tramp cargoes for
its own flag ships, but has instead tacitly accepted use
of foreign flags, including United States owned flags of
convenience, to handle non-liner commercial business
(13).
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STRUCTURE OF MARINE FREIGHT RATES
Heavy grains are exported on three general type of ves
sels; liners, tankers, and tramp steamers. Liners accounted
for 22.1 percent of heavy grain exports in 1958 but decreased
to 5,1 percent in 1965. Tankers increased their portion of
the trade from 5.3 percent in 1958 to 14.3 percent in 1966-
Tramps accounted for the major share in both years and have
increased their relative share, carrying 80.6 percent in
1966 and 71.6 percent in 1958 (4) .
Tramp shipping of United States grain under voyage
charter may be divided into two distinct markets. One com
posed of United States-flag vessels competing for 50 percent
of the Government-sponsored grain cargoes guaranteed them by
the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (25); the other is foreign-
flag vessels competing for private shipments and the remain
ing portion of the Government-sponsored grain cargoes. The
rates charged by United States-flag vessels are so much
higher than those charged by foreign-flag vessels that com
petition between the two is non-existent. Consequently,
United States-flag vessels are found in the trades where
large quantities of Government-sponsored grain move.
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Anatomy of a Freight Rate
Competition, costs, and commodities go hand-in-hand in
determining a grain freight rate. Although competition ap
pears as the dominant factor, the influence of costs and
commodities must not be forgotten (10).
Commodity
The nature of a commodity is one of the major factors
which make up the anatomy of an ocean freight rate. The
character of the cargo will influence the costs associated
with its handling, stowage, and its susceptibility to damage
and pilferage. The value of cargo per unit weight and the
volume and availability must also be considered.
Heavy grain has a low value per unit of weight. Pil
ferage and damage, because of grains low unit value does not
appear to be a major cost consideration. In most cases,
heavy grains are shipped in shipload quantities, but the
availability of such shipments varies from time to time.
Costs
Distance as a determinant of cost is not so important
as might at first be supposed, because of the large pro
portion of terminal costs to total costs incurred by an
ocean carrier. In some trades this proportion is well above
50 percent. Accordingly, total costs increase at a much
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slower rate than distance; for example, an increase of 40
percent in distance may entail an increase of only 20 per
cent in costs (7) .
Other costs which must be considered are:
1. Cost of handling; which will be directly influenced
by the commodity and degree of mechanization.
2. Lighterage; incurred at ports where ships cannot
tie up at piers (e.g., tankers active in the trade
destined for the East Coast of India).
3. Costs of calling at several loading or unloading
areas. Extra charges vary from 25^ to per long
ton for each additional port (16, 17, 18).
4. Fixed charges, such as interest on indebtedness,
rental, and other fixed charges that must be covered
in the freight rate.
5. Insurance on hull, worlanan's compensation and other
insurance.
6. Port facilities costs; berth fees.
7. Port regulations; hours of transit. If a ship ar
rives in a port at an hour in which facilities for
piloting, towing and berthing are not available,
this constitutes lost time.
8. Port charges and dues of every nature.
9. Canal tolls-
10. Port location; ports located on rivers require
42
extra time.
We must also recognize economies of scale that will
influence the costs involved. Ocean transportation has the
tendency to operate like an industry with decreasing costs.
Economies in the overhead of management and administration
of a shipping concern is evident, ^e complex nature of the
maritime industry requires highly developed managerial
abilities. The reason for the complexity of this activity
can be found in the unstable character of ocean traffic with
its exposure to constant and violent fluctuations, rapid
change in prospects, and unique difficulties in correctly
forecasting future developments. One must compete with
firms of other nationalities which enjoy the advantage of
favorable treatment and protection by their governments (14).
The possibility of operating a larger vessel can also
increase economies of scale. This possibility requires not
only the necessary volume of freight, but also adequate port
facilities. Once these two requirements are met, there is
no doubt that within certain limits the cost of transport per
unit decrease as the vessel's capacity rises.
The possibility of external economies must also be con
sidered. If complementary activities are achieving a higher
degree of specialization and efficiency, the efficiency of
^For information concerning costs associated with shipping
see Davis , LeRoy (4),
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the maritime enterprise itself will also increase.
The production costs of ocean transport service are
distinguished by the heavy weight of fixed costs. This
fact is important in a variety of ways. Shipping concerns
are notable examples of firms operating under increasing
returns precisely because of the high proportion of fixed
costs to total costs. Substantial economies of scale can
therefore be gained as the enterprise grows in size. This,
in turn, makes modestly endowed firms turn to the use of
chartered vessels rather than operate their own ships.
The factors which might cause rates on one route to be
higher than those on another are (7):
1. Distances - longer distances entail higher costs.
2. Voliime of traffic - influence economies of scale.
3. Directional balance of traffic (i.e., more economi
cal per unit; if approximately half of its moves
in each direction).
4. Ease of access to berths.
5. The frequency and degree of port congestion.
6. The quality and cost of stevedoring.
7. The quality and cost of repairs.
8. The cost of fuel.
9. The charges imposed on ship operators by govern
mental agencies and by terminal owners and
operators.
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10. The rates and quality of transportation by rail,
truck# or domestic water carrier between various
ports and the ultimate origin or destination of
the goodS/ as well as the cost and expedition of
transfer at the port.
11. Quality and cost of storage at the port; the
availability of forwarders.
12. The availability of free counsel on problems re
lating to transportation.
Competition
Changes in the demand for a product and in the supply
of the product tend to effect changes in its price- A dif
ference in its application to foreign shipping, follows
from the greater sensitivity of demand and supply in that
field to certain international factors related to political
and military developments which are subject to extreme and
sometimes sudden change. As a consequence, the market for
foreign shipping is characterized by relatively sharp
swings, both upward and downward.
Supply of shipping capacity
The volatility of the market in ocean transportation
is a consequence not only of abrupt changes in the demand
for the service but also of two characteristics in the be
havior of the supply of vessel tonnage (7): 1. Abrupt
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changes in supply without regard to the demand for the ser
vice. 2. Failure of the supply of vessel tonnage to adjust
itself rapidly to changes in demand. This supply should not
be gauged solely by the amount of world tonnage in existence,
for part of the world tonnage will be unavailable at a given
time in a given trade.
Failure of the supply of vessel tonnage to adjust itself
or to remain adjusted to the demand for service results from
a combination of factors. A vessel's usefulness is usually
taken to be twenty years but in many cases it is much longer-
There is also a high cost associated with the laying up of
a vessel. Construction of a new vessel may require a year
or two, and by the time of delivery a volatile demand may
have become much more intense or may have turned sharply
downward.
As a result of these factors# there sometimes are
serious time lags in the adjustment of vessel supply to the
demand for shipping service and sometimes changes in supply
without regard to demand requirements. These lags and changes
may operate in either direction, i.e., to create a shortage
or an excess of tonnage-
The results of this volatility in the relation of sup
ply to demand are a tendency towards great variation from
time to time in rates changed by ocean carriers. The sharp
ness varies because charter rates may reflect actual and
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presently anticipated changes in the volatile relation of
supply to demand-
As a direct consequence of changes in the prospective
earning power of a vessel, the vessel's marTtet value will
change. Earning power is virtually the sole determinant of
vessel value. A new vessel cannot be obtained immediately,
and, by the time the vessel owner can have one built, the
demand for whose exploitation he wished to use the vessel
may diminish in intensity and will certainly diminish in
duration (7).
In the short-term supply schedule and intermediate sup
ply schedule we have several factors to consider. This time
period would consist of the period of time less than the
time needed to build a vessel. Factors to consider are;
1 2
speed of vessels, conversions, tie-ups, repairs and
3
scrappings.
The main purpose of slowing down a vessel would be to
save on fuel, but the result is loss of capacity. It is
Conversions: refers to the entrance or exit of vessels
to or from other trades, such as bulk vessels entering the
oil trade or tankships entering the grain trade.
2
Tie-up: refers to idleness for economic reasons. When
a vessel is in tie-up it is under the care of only a skeleton
crew that stands watch and performs minor repairs (37).
^Scrapping: breaking up old vessels for scrap metal-
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necessary, therefore, to balance the cost of such loss of
capacity against lower usage of fuel. With an increase
in speed, we use more fuel and also increase capacity- The
increase in cost of fuel must be offset by the increased
revenue from additional returns from the increased cargo.
The relative increase of speed will be limited by technical
conditions of the vessel and with a higher depreciation of
machinery.
Very closely correlated with the speed of the vessel
is the time occupied in loading and discharging which may
be decreased by careful allocation and management of ships#
labor, and storage equipment, so as to eliminate all avoid
able delays.
Conversions of other vessels to the grain trade is
becoming more important each year. Tankers are carrying a
larger percent of the grain exports each year (4)• The es
timate of cost of cleaning a tanker varies with the source.
One source (37) states the cost as $30,000 to $35,000 for a
16,500 D.W.T.^ vessel. The other source (1) states the cost to
range from 1500 pounds ($4,200) to 5,000 pounds ($14,000).
The incidence, as well as the level of repairs is ex
pected to vary with the level of the spot rates- During
periods of low rates, repairs are extended as long as
^Dead weight ton-
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uncertainty prevails. Once the near-future course of rates
becomes clear, vessels are taken away from extended repairs
and led to tie-up. Tie-ups occur when the loss incurred by
operating is greater than the cost of idleness. Very closely
associated with tie-ups is the number of scrappings (37).
Scrapping will seldom occur at high rate levels but is not
an uncommon operation at low rate levels. Scrapping will
generally occur during extended periods of low rate levels
(7).
Demand for shipping capacity
The elasticity of demand for a service with respect to
a specific commodity tends to vary in part with the elas
ticity of the demand for the commodity itself. A high ratio
of freight rate to value tends to imply a high degree of
elasticity in the demand for the serivce. That is, if the
freight rate is approximately half of the value of the com
modity, and 10 percent of the value represents profit, a
16 percent increase in the rate will reduce the profit from
10 percent to 2 percent. If the freight rate is only 5 per
cent of the value of the commodity, a 16 percent increase
would reduce the 10 percent profit to 9.2 percent (7).
A dramatic expansion in vessel lot shipments, pre
dominately via foreign flags, has resulted chiefly from
increased movements of cheap, nonperishable, bulk goods as
compared to manufactured and finished products-
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The increased use of tramps and bulk carriers to carry
bulk commodities also reflect changing economies of ocean
transportation. Prior to World War II, intense competition
for cargoes and the concentration of government aid on
berth services caused about one-third of the bulk cargoes
in United States foreign trade to be shipped on liners (7).
Since World War II neither United States nor foreign flag
liners have been compelled to consign so large a portion of
their capacity to low-rated bulk goods.
Freight rates
Fluctuations of charter quotations have become more
violent in the period following World War II. Two main
reasons account for this (14): one, the intervention in
the commodity markets by governments offering, withholding,
or buying large volumes of such products has created new
and practically unforeseeable oscillations in the demand for
tramp shipping, and second, the growing tendency of shippers
to own their own fleets or to hold substantial long-term
time charters has made the market for shorter charters more
supplemental and marginal and subject to great variation.
Among tankers, the opposite tendency seems to be at work
with the share of independent operators rising (14).
Wartime controls over ocean freight rates were dis
continued early in 1946. Through 1948, charter rates on
both United States and foreign tonnage stood at three to
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four times their depressed prewar levels. In mid-1948 the
tramp charter rates declined to about half its postwar peak
At the outbreak of the Korean War, tramp rates increased to
almost triple their 1949 low, to which they returned fol
lowing activation of reserve ships which operated as an
important brake (13).
During periods of short supply. United States-flag
tramps have been able to operate profitably at the world
market rate. However, when charter rates have dropped,
American operators have been unable to meet foreign com
petition. As a result. United States registered tramps
have had to charge more than the going foreign rate- In
1963, this differential was approximately 2.2 to 1—a sur
charge which only the Government has been willing to pay
(13).
The most significant variable in shipping costs is the
increased cost of labor associated with United States-flag
vessels. Prior to World War II, United States seamen's
wages were about 50 percent above those of the principal
European maritime nations. Now they are three to five
times greater (13).
In recent years, rates paid for shipments via United
States—flag tramps have averaged more than twice those
charged by foreign flags. Furthermore, United States-flag
liners, both subsidized and non-subsidized have been able
52
to maintain their rates at approximately the level charged
by United States-flag tramps. Rates for shipments via the
few modern United States-flag supertankers which have par
ticipated in the business appear typically to have been 20->
25 percent below the tramp rates, although this difference
may be partially a result of differences in the costs of
loading and discharging cargoes (13).
United States grain exports under government financed
programs, including PL 480 and A.I.D. shipments amounted to
8,179,721 long tons in 1958 and 15,780,507 long tons in
1966 (4). Government financed shipments amount to a sub
stantial niomber of shiploads- If the average shipment in
1966 was 20,000 tons, this would amount to approximately
890 shiploads of grain.
The Department of Agriculture requires that countries
purchasing PL 480, Title I grains, repay the United States
for the estimated cost of shipments set on United States-
flag vessels. In 1963 the estimated expense of handling
$147 million of United States-flag shipments via foreign
carriers was $67.5 million—54 percent below the United
States rate (13).
About $20 million of indirect subsidies is estimated
to have been paid to United States-flag liner companies
through rates on Government-sponsored bulk cargoes in ex
cess of rates charged by foreign carriers for comparable
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service (13).
Shipments of subsidized farm products through private
channels does not fall within the scope of the cargo pref
erence laws. However, in October 1963, President Kennedy
stipulated that Government approval of wheat exports to
Russia would be conditioned to their transport in available
American ships, supplemented by ships of other countries
as required.
Surplus grain shipment rates are negotiated, regardless
of whether shipment is by tramp or liner. Although rates
are negotiated, there is a potential for considerable com
petition among United States-flag ships for the United
States share of surplus grain cargoes. The hundred-odd
ships in the United States-flag tramp fleet are operated
by some twenty to thirty independent or quasi-independent
firms. Where there is frequent berth services. United
States-flag liners may be able to handle a large propor
tion of the shipment as "bottom cargoes" without adding
significantly to their costs. When rates are high or other
business is slow, tankers may enter the grain trade to com
pete for shipments to Asia or Africa.
An adequate economic explanation is not available to
support the apparent difference in tramp and supertanker
rates for handling grains. The difference may reflect in
part the attitudes of the Government's contracting officers.
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who have applied a lower maximum guideline to shipments via
large modern bulk carriers, and in part differences in
operating costs. The offsetting cargo-handling costs flow
from the needs of lighters to offload a portion of the deep-
draft vessel's cargoes in certain ports and from the neces
sity for adequate facilities to warehouse their enormous
cargoes (13).
Analysis of Tan^cship Freight Rates
Since there are inadequate studies available to show
certain relationships that occur between supply, demand,
shipbuilding and rate levels that exist in the grain trade
it has been necessary to rely on two studies (9, 37) based
on tanker operation in the oil trade. The oil trade appears
to be quite similar in nature to that of the grain trade.
Some of the similarities are:
1. Short-term rates are formed by the interaction of
the donand schedule as affected by price expecta
tion and the usual static supply schedule-
2. An increase or decrease in total demand for oil
or grain, will affect all producers in more or
less the same qualitative way because oil and
grain are homogenous products.
3. Vessels operation in both trades are influenced
by world events.
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4. Presence of voyage and time chartered vessels.
5. Economies of scale are present.
6. Little can be done to increase capacity in the
short run.
7. They are subject to the same degree of control.
When the world tanker fleet is fully employed, the only
element of elasticity in the supply of transportation ser
vices by tankers consist in the possibility of changes in
the degree of utilization of the fleet in response to
changes in rates. This elasticity is strongly limited by
the technical conditions of tanker operations.
The demand for tankship services are considered to be
inelastic because (37);
1. Transportation is an input to a factor for which
the demand is inelastic.
2. Ocean transportation is very specialized/ hence,
technically the substitution of other input factors
for it is almost impossible.
3. The cost of transportation is only a small fraction
of the total cost of the final product that uses
it as an input.
Tanker freight rates fluctuate over a wide range. These
fluctuations are extensive and spasmodic and sometimes take
place within rather short periods. It appears that time
charter rates show fluctuations which closely correspond to
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those in voyage charter rates. Furthermore, the volume of
time chartering also expands and contracts in accordance
with the movements in rates. The incentive for time char
tering is the anticipation, or even the anticipated pos
sibility, of larger future transportation requirements, not
the pressure of present needs (9).
The relative inelasticity of both supply and demand in
years of prosperity explains the excessive fluctuations of
tanker rates in response to changes in demand factors and
supply factors in such periods. It appears that fluctua
tions in such demand factors as are connected with changes
in demand for oils and in the location of production have
generally been predominant in causing the year-to-year fluc
tuations in tanker rates, while the significance of the more
gradually changing supply factors, in particular the trans
portation capacity, lies in their influence on the average
level of rates over some consecutive years (9).
When a recession in demand leaves an appreciable part
of the fleet idle, the elasticity of supply is greatly in
creased by the possibility of changes in the transportation
capacity in employment- Rates fall to a level corresponding
to the difference between the cost of operation and the cost
of laying-up for the ships at the margin of employment. Ac
cordingly, as long as a depression lasts, changes in demand
or deliveries of new tankers lose nearly all of their
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influence on tanker rates.
A high level of rates regularly leads to large-scale
ordering of new tankers by each of the more important group
of owners. Upon their completion about one year later, these
ships have a depressing influence on the tanker freight mar
ket. Owing to this mechanism, rates show a tendency to
develop in cycles, the shape of which is, however, greatly
influenced by the course of demand factors (9).
During the ten years between 1949 and 1958, the tank-
ship market went through two complete cycles. If we define
a cycle as the period from trough to trough, we find that
the first cycle lasted from July 1949 to July 1954, the
second one from July 1954 to July 1958 (37)-
Once rates start falling elastic expectations take over
again. Buyers will interpret a fall in prices as a signal
of future price declines of greater consequence. As a result,
the operatives will at this point postpone orders of all
kinds, thus prolonging the depression in the tanker service
markets and also creating a future tonnage shortage which
will give rise to another disturbance; therefore, a cyclical
demand pattern is not necessary to the mechanism of cyclical
rates. Changes in demand may bring about a change in the
duration as well as in the intensity of the cycle but will
not eliminate it. In addition, the suddenness and magnitude
of the rate changes may influence the intensity of expecta-
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tions/ which/ in turn, may influence the amplitude of the
cycle (37).
A substantial price movement away from normal rates
will create expectations that future rates will increase
proportionately more than present prices. These expecta
tions will then cause those in the market to change their
purchasing plans, and shift their purchases from future to
present periods.
The impact of expectations on the amounts of tanker
services wanted at the various rates is immediate, but in
the case of tankship building the increase in orders for
new vessels will not be reflected in the available tankship
capacity until sometime later because of the construction
lead time. Given this difference in the timing of the im
pacts of rate expectations on the available supply and de
mand# it was concluded that short-term (spot) rates are formed
by the interaction of the demand schedule as affected by
price expectations^ and the usual static supply schedule
(37) .
The tonnage demanded in the absence of price expecta
tions was found to be virtually unaffected by price move
ments and it therefore attributed the difference between
The demand schedule as affected by price expectations
will be referred to as a price expectation-quantity schedule
which is a more appropriate name.
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such infinite inelasticity and the elasticity of the
empirical demand schedule to interperiod substitutions as
caused by expectations (37).
An initial change in rates will generate expectations
about future price changes and will thus cause shifts in
purchases and chartering activities from future to current
periods. These shifts, if we assume fixed supply, will
cause further price increases, which in turn will affect
expectations. In addition to movements along a price ex
pectation-quantity schedule with positive slope,^ con
secutive shifts in the price expectation-quantity schedule
may also occur, further aggravating price movements and
chartering as well as shipbuilding activities. This spiral
will continue until either expectations change from elastic
to inelastic, the buyers withdraw from the market because
of the negative budget effect, or the supply schedules shift
and reverse the movement in rates. Once such a reversal
occurs, prices will plummet. The drop in prices will auto
matically turn the speculative purchases into surpluses.
Prices will then remain at very low levels, fluctuating
below normal until the next disturbance occurs, caused
If expectations are elastic, the necessary mechanism
for cyclical freight rates is established when the initial
disturbance occurs. The increase in rates will generate
interperiod substitutions which will make the price expecta
tion-quantity schedule assume a positive slope (37),
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either by normal attrition or accident, to repeat the cycle
(37) .
New orders placed and tie-ups were proven to be the
most important factors affecting the supply schedule. The
theoretical formulations showed that the changes in orders
placed are governed mainly by two interperiod substitution
effects and two static income effects, caused by changes in
spot rates and tankship building costs. The two substitu
tion effects are the result of expectations generated by
spot rates and shipbuilding costs# respectively and they are
positive or negative depending on the price elasticities of
expectations in the tankship service and tankship building
markets. The two income effects oppose each other/ but the
net result is expected to be positive, as long as spot rates
increase, because of the greater price fluctuations in the
tankship service market. The analysis shows that given
price-elastic expectations, the majority of orders are
placed during periods of very high spot-rate and shipbuild
ing cost levels, some at very low tankship building costs
and excessively depressed tanker rates, and very few orders
are placed during periods which one may consider as normal.
Technological changes in tankship building normally appear
during periods of depression, but even if this were not so,
only when tanker rates are very low will technological ob
solescence be manifested to threaten the economic life of
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existing vessels. The impact of technology, therefore, is
mostly incorporated in the orders for replacement# and this
impact is normally surplus producing because of the increas
ing average size and efficiency of newer vessels (37).
The short-term supply schedule is infinitely inelastic
beyond full capacity and extremely elastic below. The ca
pacity that separates the elastic from the inelastic part
of the short term supply schedule is not greater than 2
percent of the total (37).
The shape of the price expectation-quantity schedule in
the region affected by interperiod substitutions will cause
violent fluctuations in the spot rates above normal rates.
Because of the extreme inelasticity of the supply schedule
in this region, the fluctuations will be swift and extensive.
Rates will remain at high levels until expectations, short-
selling, or new capacity precipitate a downturn, and then
they will slide continuously until they reach the tie-up
cost of the marginal capacity. There, rates will remain
fluctuating below normal rates until either shifts in de
mand or attrition eliminate the excess capacity and create
shortages. When this taXes place, spot rates will be forced
above the full cost of the marginal vessel, will influence
expectations, shifts in demand, etc. and will start another
cycle (37).
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ANALYSIS OF HEAVY GRAIN FREIGHT RATES AND
EXPORT SHIPMENT DATA
The level of ocean freight rates for United States ex
ports in relation to a competitor's freight rate will in
fluence the competitive position of United States heavy grain
exports- The level of freight rates will also influence the
quantity of heavy grains exported. Many factors influence
the level of freight rates and the subsequent quantity of
heavy grain shipped from a particular country. Among the
more important are the supply and demand for heavy grains.
By analysis of the quantities exported from the United
States, one can determine the major deficit areas of the
world. With the realization of the demand areas, and
knowledge of the larger supply areas, such as the United
States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, one realizes
that transportation of heavy grains from the supply areas
to the demand areas requires the moving of huge quantities
of heavy grains many thousands of miles.
Distance is not as important in the determination of
a marine freight rate as one might expect. In some trades,
the proportion of terminal costs to total costs are well
above 50 percent (7).
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With the proportion of terminal costs high, all
shippers are interested in efficient loading and unload
ing methods. Since ocean shipping operates like a de
creasing cost industry as vessels get larger, shippers
are interested in the utilization of the largest vessels
available, and the utilization of this capacity to the
utmost. However, restrictions are present in the ship
ping industry which prevent the utilization of the larger
vessels, such as supply of such vessels, port restrictions
in terms of depth of water, and the necessary equipment
to unload the commodity at a fast rate. Therefore, the
size of the vessel that may be employed may be limited
by the capacity of the loading or unloading port, supply
of vessels, and the supply and demand for the commodity
transported.
To accomplish an analysis of the size of shijxnents, it
was necessary to acquire a sample of shipments of United
States heavy grain exports. Since approximately 70+ percent
of the heavy grains exported from the United States between
1961 and 1966 was shipped via tramp vessels under voyage
charters (4, 8), this procedure seems logical. The sample
data was acquired from Maritime Research, Inc. (16, 17, 18)
and consists of that portion of the heavy grain shipped via
voyage chartered tramp vessels and reported to Maritime
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Research/ Inc. (16, 17, 18). Since reporting of the vessels
chartered was not mandatory, the sample does not consist of
all heavy grain shipped via voyaged chartered tramp vessels.
In addition to quantity shipped, data on the freight rates
and voyage charters were also collected.
Voyage charters may be classed into two general types
in terms of areas of loading or unloading. One type names
the specific port of loading or unloading and the second
type names a range of loading or unloading possibilities.
Any specific charter may possess the two general types, for
example, it may name a specific port of loading such as
Charleston and a range of unloading such as the West Coast
of India.
In addition, many charters include provisions for cer
tain services that are available at an additional charge.
Such a service may be loading at more than one port. The
addition of a charge for the extra service or option, tends
to make freight rates associated with a particular trade
route appear higher than what they actually are. An analysis
of the extra charges associated with the employment of an
option should yield some basic rate relationships between
and among ports. The analysis of the extra charges also
should yield an approximate charge for the various extra
services in any one particular trade.
Options and many more factors influence the level of an
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ocean freight rate. A change in any one factor may in
fluence the level of the rate. Of the more important factors
that do influence rates, three unregulated factors seem to
be the most important, namely, political, military, and
economic events, such as wars, famines, and revolts. Their
direct influence would be the influencing of supply and de
mand for certain commodities and the supply and demand for
ocean vessels-
Since many factors do influence the ocean shipping in
dustry plus many being international in nature, the industry
is very complex and competitive. A study of the industry
must encompass a broad spectrum of factors and events. The
following discussion will be concerned with a very narrow
area of this broad spectrum. The area of concentration will
be the ocean shipping of heavy grains. The study will be
limited to the shipments shipped via voyage chartered ves
sels. The analysis will be divided into four general sec
tions with divisions within each. The four general sections
will be the collection of the data, analysis of the quantities
of heavy grains exported, analysis of voyage charters, and
the analysis of freight rates.
The collection of the data will be further divided into
two parts, methodology and assumptions. Methodology will
define the years the analysis covers, the origins and desti
nations of interest, the commodities included, and the terms
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used. Several assumptions will be necessary to facilitate
the collection of the data. Most assximptions will be con
cerned with factors such as options, the size of shipments,
and time for which the charter was applicable.
Following the collection of the data, the sample data
will be compared to the actual United States heavy grain
exports for the same years so one can get an indication of
the sample size and if it provides us with data for the
more important trades. The average size of shipments in
the sample will then be analyzed for all origins and des
tinations areas. The average size of shipment and a com
parison of the sample to actual heavy grain exports will
comprise the two divisions within the analysis of quantities
of heavy grains exported.
The analysis of voyage charters will be divided into
specific port charters and charter options. The naming of
a specific port would indicate that there was a relative
advantage or disadvantage in loading or unloading at that
specific port. The advantage or disadvantage should also
influence the freight rate. Also influencing the freight
rates will be the employment of charter options.
The freight rates for heavy grains will be composed
of two parts, one relating freight rates to political,
economic, and military events, and the second, an analysis
of the sample freight rates. The monthly weighted averages
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will be derived as well as the yearly means for all trade
routes. The freight rates will be grouped according to the
type of vessel, the flag fleet to which it belongs, and the
range from which the heavy grain was exported.
Collection of Data
Methodology
The study was limited to three years; 1958, 1966, and
1967. The limitation to three years was because of
the large number of charters for each year and the cost as
sociated with the collection and analysis of the data. The
year, 1958 was selected because it was the year before the
opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The years 1966 and 1967
were selected because more recent information was not avail
able. Of particular interest in 1967 was the closing of
the Suez Canal on June 6th, and its subsequent effect on
ocean shipping.
The study was also limited to four heavy grains, those
being wheat, soybeans, corn, and grain sorghum. Since over
70 percent of the heavy grains shipped between 1961 and
1966 (4, 8) were shipped via tramp vessels, the study was
limited to tramp vessels under voyage charters. Both origin
and destimation ports were usually grouped into port regions
or countries. Those being for the United States; the Great
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1 2 3 4
Lakes, North Range, Gulf, and North Pacific.
Throughout the study, rates associated with charters
stating a specific port of loading will be referred to as
specific port rates. Charters stating a particular region
of loading will be referred to as regional quotes. There
fore, when referring to the total range quantity or fixtures,
one must consider both regional charters and specific char
ters, which together represent the total for the complete
range.
Table 1 lists the origins and destinations that were
of concern to this study. The United States ports chosen
were selected because they were the major grain exporting
ports within their range- The destinations represent the
major countries of the world which import a significant
quantity of United States heavy grain.
Assumptions
In the acquisition of the freight rates and quantities
of heavy grains shipped, the following were assumed:
^Includes all United States ports located on the Great
Lakes.
2
East Coast of the United States, from Maine to the tip
of Florida.
^Includes the West Coast of Florida and all ports using
the ^Gulf of Mexico.
4
Includes all of the West Coast of the United States.
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India, East Coast of
Bombay, India
India, West Coast of
Japan
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Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Amsterdam
United Kingdom
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1. All shipments of heavy grain were delivered to the
port or port area named in the fixture. That is,
options to different ports or port areas were
never activated.
2. Quantities of heavy grain shipped were the average
of the range quoted. That is, for a fixture stat
ing the quantity shipped as 19,000 plus or minus 5
percent,^ it was assumed that 19,000 long tons were
shipped. This differs from the Hutchinson (8)
study, where he assumed that the lower limit was
shipped. In the example given, he assumed that
18,050 long tons were shipped. The method used
in the present study should estimate the actual
tonnage more accurately.
3. Multiple port loading or discharging did not occur.
4. The freight rates were applicable for the date set
for the loading of the vessel. Therefore, we assume
that the date of the fixture had no effect on the
freight rate agreed upon.
5. The port area. North Range, includes the entire
East Coast of the United States,
6. Options to consecutive trip charters were never
activated.
^The range for this example is from 18,050 long tons
to 19,950 long tons.
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Quantities of Heavy Grains Exported for
1958, 1956, and 1967
A sample consists of a small collection from some large
collection about which we seek information- The sample is
examined and the facts about it learned. Based on these
facts, the problem is to make correct inferences about the
large collection or population. We observe the sample# but
it is the population which we seek to know-
The population which we seek to know is the ocean ship
ping of heavy grain. The sample is a collection of data
consisting of heavy grain shipments shipped via voyage char
tered tramp vessels.
Comparison of actual exports to the sample
The following sector compares United States exports of
heavy grain for 1958, 1966, and 1967 to the data collected.
To further clarify the headings and labels used in Tables
2, 3, 4, and 5, each will be defined. Total exports were
the actual United States heavy grain exports for that par
ticular year. Sample exports were that quantity of heavy
grains exported via tramp vessels operating under voyage
charters and having originated at one of our origins and
going to one of our selected destinations and listed in our
source (3,6, 17, 18), The range total consists of all heavy
grains exported from the entire range; for the sample, this
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consists of both the port totals and the regional total.
For the total exports, or actual exports, all quantities
were listed in terms of the port of export. Port totals
represent exports of heavy grain originating from that port.
For the sample, these totals represent that quantity of heavy
grain shipped under specific port charters. The regional
total represents that portion of the sample that was shipped
via voyage charters naming the region of loading. The final
column informs us as to the percent of the total exports our
sample consists of.
From Table 2 the sample data collected for 1958 con
sisted of 9/469,789 long tons which were exported from the
United States aboard voyage chartered tramp vessels and were
chartered to deliver at one of the selected destinations.
This tonnage represented approximately 56.32 percent of the
total heavy grains exported for that year. In 1966 the
sample consisted of 25,816,785 long tons, but represented
only 51.03 percent of the total exports. Our 1967 sample
consisted of 22,955,524 long tons which increased the per-
centile to 52.24 percent of the total heavy grain exports.
Of the total heavy grain exports, only 2.88 percent in
1958, 4.67 percent in 1966, and 5.38 percent in 1967 were
exported from a specified port that was named in the charter
party.















































































































































































































































































































































in the heavy grain export trade. Total exports of heavy
grains have increased three-fold from 1958 to 1966- The
relative importance of each region has also changed. The
major factor influencing this important change was the open
ing of the St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1958, before the Seaway
was open, the Great Lakes exported 654,321,2 5 long tons of
heavy grain, which constituted 3,89 percent of the yearly
total. Eight years later it exported 6,200,390 long tons
or 12.26 percent of the total. For 1967, 4,468,557.85 long
tons or 10.17 percent of the total heavy grain exports
originated from the Great Lakes, a decrease in both tonnage
and percentile. The increased importance of the Great Lake
range seems to be at the expense of the North Range. Ex
ports of heavy grain originating in the North Range actually
increased from 3,687,720.92 long tons in 1958 to 4,714,683.15
long tons in 1966, but decreased in 1967 to 3,818,492.51 long
tons. Its relative percentage of the yearly total decreased
from 21.93 percent in 1958 to 9.32 percent in 1966, and 8.69
percent in 1967.
The quantity of heavy grain exported from the Gulf in
creased from 9,935,175.98 long tons in 1958 to 33,312,339.36
long tons in 1966, but decreased in 1967 to 28,494,323.8
long tons. It also increased its share of the total heavy
grain exports from 59.09 percent in 1958 to 65.84 percent
in 1966. The 1967 percentage was down slightly, to 64.88.
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Table 3. Export shipments of heavy grain; a comparison of
the sample to the total United States exports of
heavy grain for 1958
Origin Total exports Sample exports Total^ ^ 100=%
Great Lakes Total 654,321,25^^ 0^*^ 0
Regional Total 0 0
Port Total 548,066.60 0 0
Chicago 376,582.22 0 0
Duluth 34,239.63 0 0
Toledo 137,244.75 0 0
North Range Total 3,687,720.92 1,482,250.00 40.19
Regional Total 1,153,650.00
Port Total 3,199,158.53 328,600.00
Albany 430,778.21 130,500.00 30.29
Baltimore 1,044,844.16 156,600.00 14.99
Charleston 22.31 9,500.00 0^
Norfolk 1,105,676.05 32,000.00 2.89
Philadelphia 617,837.80 0 0
Gulf Total 9,935,175.98 6,294,060.00 63.25
Regional Total 6,183,860.00
Port Total 9,083.702.36 110,200.00
Baton Rouge 1,266,695.29 0 0
Beaumont 0 0 0
^.S. Department of Commerce (32),
^All amounts are in long tons,
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
^Sample quantity exceeds quantity of actual grain exports.
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Table 3 (Continued)
Origin Total exports Sample exports ^^al^ ^100=%
Brownsville 0 0 0
Corpus Christi 533,133.61 0 0
Destrehan 3,997-24 0 0
Galveston 2,007,648.35 68,500,00 3,41
Houston 1,731,417.13 14,500.00 0.84
Mobile 738,261.97 12,200.00 1,65
New Orleans 2,800,275.58 15,000,00 0.54
Pascagoula 2,273,19 0 0
North Pacific Total 2,536,062.27 1,693,488.00 66-77
Regional Total 1,647,988.00
Port Total 1,246,075.77 45,500,00
Long Beach 8,250.01 0 0
Portland 1,063,349.35 9,500.00 0.89
Sacremento 0 0 0
San Francisco 32,215.71 36,000.00
Stockton 142,260.70 0 0
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Table 4. Export shipnents of heavy grain? a comparison of
the sample to the total United States exports of
heavy grain for 1966
Origin Total exports Sample exports ^^al^ ^ 100=%
Great LaXes Total 6,200,390.00^^ 1,945,100.00^^'^ 31.37
Regional Total 1,175,750,00
Port Total 4,107,144.68 769,350.00
Chicago 1,957,859.79 265,600.00 13.57
Duluth 597,452.21 120,000.00 20.09
Toledo 1,551,832.68 383,750.00 24.73
North Range Total 4,714,683.15 2,102,050.00 44.58
Regional Total 1,603,550.00
Port Total 4,531,937.39 498,500.00
Albany 390,624.84 63,950.00 16.37
Baltimore 1,641,574.20 183,750.00 11.19
Charleston 247,425.38 96,500.00 39.00
Norfolk 1,523,705.03 71,300.00 4.68
Philadelphia 728,607-94 83,000.00 11.39
Gulf Total 33,312,339,36 17,598,302.00 52.82
Regional Total 16,977,047.00
Port Total 31,500,737.18 621,255.00
Baton Rouge 3,112,996.25 75,000.00 2.41
Beaumont 1,997,681.42 28,500.00 1.43
Brownsville 161,685.95 44,000.00 27.21
^.S. Department of Commerce (33).
^All amounts are in long tons.
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
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Table 4 (Continued)
Origin Total exports Sample exports ^ 100=%
Corpus Christi 2,595,080.06 0 0
Destrehan 5,375,910.54 99,500.00 1.85
Galveston 2,829,734.38 129,000.00 4.56
Houston 6,208,323.25 22,780.00 0.37
Mobile 810,411.62 0 0
New Orleans 6,211,537.84 112,475.00 1.81
Pascagoula 2,197,375.87 110,000.00 5.01
North Pacific Total 6,367,214.50 4,171,333.00 65.51
Regional Total 3,699,333.00
Port Total 3,208,031.63 472,000.00
Long Beach 914,499.50 426,000.00 46.58
Portland 2,081,592.21 0 0
Sacramento 800.00 0 0
San Francisco 16,760.83 0 0
Stockton 195,171.09 46,000.00 23.57
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Table 5. Export shipments of heavy grain; a comparison of
the sample to the total United States exports of
heavy grain for 1967
Origin Total exports Sample exports ^^al^ ^100=%
Great Lakes Total 4,468,557.8^^^1,664,809.00^^ 37.26
Regional Total 1,271,809.00
Port Total 3,216,585.84 383,000.00
Chicago 1,438,987-42 63,000.00 4.37
Duluth 393,327.14 58,700.00 14.92
Toledo 1,384,271.28 271,300.00 19.59
North Range Total 3,818,492.51 2,101,550.00 55.03
Regional Total 1,504,650.00
Port Total 3,658,442.94 596,900.00
Albany 257,101.78 0 0
Baltimore 803,933,87 115,000.00 14.30
Charleston 423,299,47 224,200.00 5 2,96
Norfolk 1,547,158.08 206,700.00 13.35
Philadelphia 626,949,74 51,000.00 8.13
Gulf Total 28,494,323.80 15,475,745,00 54.31
Regional Total 14,382,070.00
Port Total 27,937,998.73 1,093,675.00
Baton Rouge 3,326,526.11 45,980.00 1.38
^.S. Department of Commerce (31, 34),
All amounts are in long tons.
c-'19,670.42 long tons of grain sorghum could not be
assigned from source (31) to a range.
^Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
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Table 5 (Continued)
Origin Total exports Sample exports Sample ^
X
Beaumont 1,144,837.69 0 0
Brownsville 508,810.60 320,300.00 62.95
Corpus Christi 1,482,273.86 69,500.00 4.68
Destrehan 7,526,905.90 62,000.00 0.82
Houston 4,251,398.27 78,000.00 1,83
^oh±le 488,231.14 80,100.00 16.40
New Orleans 5,952,976.78 197,300.00 3.31
Pascagoula 2,442,616.85 179,000.00 7.32
North Pacific Total 7,136,764.23 3,713,420.00 52.03
Regional Total 1,348,745.00
Port Total 3,592,657.73 2,364,675.00
Long Beach 578,482.06 169,100.00 29.23
Portland 2,651,412.41 0 0
Sacramento 168,023.24 15,000.00 8.92
San Francisco 36,180,90 24,000.00 66.33
Stockton 158,559.12 73,000.00 46.03
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The North Pacific, although increasing the total
amount exported from 2,536,062.27 long tons in 1958 to
6,367,214.50 in 1966, decreased its share of the total
heavy grain exports from 15.08 percent in 1958 to 12.58
percent in 1966. In 1967, the North Pacific increased
its tonnage to 7,136,764.23 and its percentage to 16.25.
It was the only region that increased tonnage or percentage
in 1967.
The great relative importance of the Gulf region pos
sibly can be attributed to the availability of cheap water
transportation on the Mississippi and the availability of
excellent loading facilities. Cheap rail rates also have
had some influence.
The influence on the Gulf region of the opening of the
St. Lawrence Seaway has not lived up to expectations.^
Again, cheap water rates and cheap rail rates to Gulf ports
have somewhat equalized the advantages that many experts
felt the Great La3ces ports would acquire with the opening
of the Seaway. Some minor factors also to consider in the
Great LaXes were the limit placed on vessel size and delays
^Jorgenson, Robert K. City of Milwaukee, Board of
Harbor Commissioners, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Information
on St. Lawrence Seaway expectations. Private Communica
tion. 1968.
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associated with the navigation of the lock system.
Great Lakes In 1958, no voyage charters for heavy
grain via tramp vessels were recorded, due to the fact that
the St. Lawrence Seaway was not yet complete and the grain
had to be transshipped from lake carriers to ocean going
vessels. Of the total heavy grain exports from the Great
Lakes range for 1966 and 1967, the sample consisted on only
31.37 and 37-26 percent of the total grain exports, respec
tively- The most apparent reason for this small percentage
was the fact that much of the heavy grain exported from the
Great Lakes range was shipped to St. Lawrence ports where
it was used to fill ocean going vessels to capacity. The
practice is made necessary because of the Seaways limited
depth. ^
The naming of the specific port of loading was more
common in the Great Lakes range than any other range. The
logical explanation was that due to the shape of the Great
Lakes, the location of the port of loading would have more
effect on costs than any other range. Differing costs
should be reflected in the freight rate.
North Range The sample for the North Range con
sists of 40.19 percent of the actual North Range heavy
The Seaway cannot accommodate vessels drawing more
than 25.5 feet of water (24).
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grain exports for 1958. In 1966/ it consisted of 44.58
percent/ but declined to 37.26 percent in 1967.
Gulf The sample for the Gulf comprises 63.25,
52.82/ and 54.31 percent of the yearly exports of heavy
grain from the Gulf in 1958, 1966, and 1967, respectively.
North Pacific The reason why the 1958 and 1966
sample was larger with respect to the total heavy grain
exports of the range than any other range was not known.
We have accounted for 66.77 percent of the 1958 exports
of heavy grain and 65.51 percent of the 1966 exports. The
percentage for 1967 was lower with the sample representing
52.03 percent of the total exports.
Shipment size
Since size of vessel does influence cost, it seems
logical that size of shipment should influence freight
rates. From Table 6 we see that the size of the average
shipment has increased in the last ten years. The largest
average was for shipments originating from the Gulf. Size
of shipments was influenced by the ability of loading and
unloading facilities and their associated harbors to ac
commodate large vessels, the use of lighters, and the
presence of tankers.
Table 7 shows the draft for the selected United States
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ports and destinations. 1 A 15 , 000 D. W.T. vessel can enter 
any of the selected origins or destinations . A 30,000 D.W. T. 
vessel requires a draft of 28 fee t anda55 , 000 D.W . T . vessel 
requires a draft of 38 feet. 2 
By comparing Tables 8 and 9 we can determine the im-
portance of the regions of export and the average size of the 
shipments for each foreign destination . Size of shipments 
to Peru, Venezuela, and Haiti , although originating mainly 
from the Gulf were far below the Gulf's average . This 
would indicate that the limiting factor must be either the 
foreign port's capacity or the demand for heavy grain . 
Shipments to the United Kingdom were smaller in size 
than to other European ports , thus the capacity of the 
ports of the United Kingdom must be the limiting factor . 
The origin of such shipments may also influence size of 
shipments to some extent . 
Another interesting difference of shipment size was 
prevalent in the Indian trade . Bombay's average size ship-
ment f or 1958 , 1966, and 1967 was 13,620, 19,895, a nd 19,723 
long tons, respectively. The average size of the shipments 
to the Wes t Coas t , excluding Bombay for the same years were 
1nead weight ton . 
2navis, LeRoy (4). 
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Table 6. Average size of the heavy grain shipments for the 




Year Great North Gulf North 
yearly 
Lakes Range Pacific average 
1958a ob 10.465 11 . 465 11 . 289 11 . 247 
1966c 12 . 311 15 . 357 28 . 615 16.752 17 . 698 
1967d 14 . 864 15.921 21 . 112 11.219 19 . 003 
aMaritime Research, Inc . (16). 
bAll amounts are in thousands of long tons . 
cMaritime Research, Inc. (17) . 
dM 't' R h I ar1 ime esearc , nc . (18) • 
10 , 476, 12 , 682, and 13,019 long tons. The average size of 
shipment in these two trades do appear to influence freight 
rates as will be noted later . 
On t h e East Coast of India , Madras' average shipment 
size was 21,000 and 20 , 227 long tons for 1966 and 1967, 
r espectively. For the East Coast , excl uding Madras , the 
average size was 9 , 81 8 , 16 , 167, and 20 , 482 long t o ns for 1958, 
1966 , and 1967 . The s i ze o f shipments to the East Coast 
was l arger than the shipments to the West Coast. This was 
due to the presence of tankers i n the East Coast trade . 
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West Coast of India
Japan









•"X" data was not available.
Finlayson, John, Cooke and Company, Grain Division,
Memphis, Tenn. Data on depth. Private Communication.
1969.
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Table 8. The percent of heavy grain shipments originating
from the four export regions of the U.S. for the











Chile 1958^ 0 0 0 0
1966^ 0 0 92.0 8.0
1967 0 0 48.432 51.568
Peru 1958 0 0 100.000 0
1966 0 0 100.000 0
1967 0 0 100.000 0
Venezuela 1958 0 35.849 64.150 0
1966 12.442 11.817 75.741 0
1967 0 18.301 73.451 8.247
Haiti 1958 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 100.000 0
1967 0 0 100.000 0
Philippines 1958 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 0 100.000
1967 0 0 6.278 93.722
Madras, India 1958 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 100.000 0
1967 0 0 90.112 9.888
Union of South 1958 0 0 0 0
Africa 1966 7.892 3.991 88,117 0
1967 25.0 0 75.000 0
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16) .
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17) f












Hamburg 1958 0 46 -479 53 .521 0
1966 17 .225 0 80 .628 2 .147
1967 15 .148 7 -289 72 .889 4 .674
Norway 1958 0 0 100 .000 0
1966 7 .163 7 ,163 69 .146 16 .529
1967 0 20 -000 80 .000 0
Italy 1958 0 9 .865 90 .135 0
1966 25 .844 3 .843 70 .313 0
1967 10,,000 8 .442 81 -558 0
Antwerp 1958 0 11,.108 83,,351 5..541
1966 23..628 2.,976 73,,397 0
1967 13..671 1..846 84,.484 0
Rotterdam 1958 0 15..911 68,.517 15..572
1966 8..083 7..141 83,.189 1..588
1967 8..012 12..309 79,.679 0
East Coast of 1958 0 11..729 29..332 58.,878
India 1966 0 10.,137 35..320 54,,543
1967 0 14,.352 43,.157 42,,491
United Kingdom 1958 0 16,,866 83.,134 0
1966 33.,370 28.,808 37,,822 0
1967 25,,729 57,,484 16,,787 0
Brazil 1958 0 0 100.,000 0
1966 0 6. 509 93. 491 0
1967 0 0, 985 99. 015 0
Amsterdam, 1958 0 39. 855 60. 144 0
Rotterdam, 1966 19. 088 1. 620 78, 767 0. 526
Antwerp 1967 30. 730 3. 248 66. 023 0
West Coast of 1958 0 81. 320 18. 680 0
India 1966 1, 612 20. 481 77. 585 0- 501












Japan 1958 0 1..970 58..034 39..996
1966 1..480 0,.236 60..449 37..835
1967 1,.128 0 60..186 38..686
Bombay, India 1958 0 13..705 55..115 31..180
1966 0 16..049 68..570 15..381
1967 0,,885 3.,922 76..409 18,.784
Table 9, The average size of the shipments from the four













Chile 1958^ 0^ 0 0 0
1966 0 0 14,.091 13..500 14 .042
1967^ 0 0 11..583 12..333 11..958
Peru 1958 0 0 9..916 0 9,.916
1966 0 0 10,.080 0 10..080
1967 0 0 12..900 0 12..900
Venezuela 1958 0 9,,500 17.,000 0 13,.250
. 1966 10.2 9. 688 9.,199 0 9..369
1967 0 7. 671 8.,289 12. 100 8..384
Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
^All amounts are in thousands of long tons.
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).













Haiti 1958 0 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 9 >644 0 9 .644
1967 0 0 10 .419 0 10 .419
Philippines 1958 0 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 0 16 .588 16 .588
1967 0 0 12 .100 15 .709 14 .420
Madras, India 1958 0 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 21 .000 0 21 .000
1967 0 0 20 .050 22 .000 20 .227
Union of South 1958 0 0 0 0 0
Africa 1966 14..500 22,.000 20 .375 0 19 .686
1967 15..000 0 15,.000 0 15 .000
Hamburg 1958 0 9,.429 19,.000 0 12,.909
1966 11..700 0 24,.341 17..500 20 .378
1967 11..950 23..000 19..167 14..750 17..531
Norway 1958 0 0 8..500 0 8,.500
1966 13.,000 13..000 15,.688 15..000 15..125
1967 0 15..500 17..714 0 17..222
Italy 1958 0 11..000 9.,136 0 9..292
1966 10. 471 10..900 17.,341 0 14..545
1967 9- 240 19.,500 15..072 0 14..438
Antwerp 1958 0 12. 171 12. 043 12. 142 12..062
1966 10. 720 13. 500 20. 813 0 16.,804
1967 12. 500 13. 500 26. 870 0 22.,859
Rotterdam 1958 0 11. 750 14. 457 11. 500 13. 427
1966 13. 624 16.850 26. 290 18. 733 23. 441
1967 16. 526 19. 233 30. 210 0 26. 580
East Coast of 1958 0 8. 769 9. 503 10. 230 9. 818
India 1966 0 29. 500 16. 579 14. 697 16. 167
1967 0 21. 883 25. 750 16. 660 20. 482
United Kingdom 1958 0 9. 112 9. 907 0 9. 823
1966 10. 387 13. 321 13. 024 0 11. 989













Brazil 1958 0 0 11,.921 0 11,.921
1966 0 16,.825 16,,959 0 16 .950
1967 0 9,.500 14,.462 0 14,.388
Antwerp, 1958 0 13..750 20,.750 0 17..250
Rotterdam 1966 16..158 21..250 29,.529 13,.800 25..233
Amsterdam 1967 19..626 18..667 30,.770 0 25..737
West Coast of 1958 0 10,.513 10..318 0 10..476
India 1966 10,.833 11..162 13..224 10..100 12..682
1967 17..000 13,.108 12..843 14..000 13..019
Japan 1958 0 10,.400 11..634 10,.921 11..312
1966 13.,429 15..000 19,.202 17,.048 18,.204
1967 13.,200 0 23.,965 15,,616 19,.708
Bombay, India 1958 0 10.,769 14,.075 14.,477 13,.620
1966 0 21.,287 19,,645 19..671 19,,895
1967 18, 500 20.,500 19.,720 19..635 19.,723
Table 10. Average size of shipments of heavy grain originat*













^Maritime Research# Inc. (16).
All amounts are in thousands of long tons
c.
'Maritime Research, Inc. (17).











Albany 10.875 10.658 24.000
Baltimore 9.786 20.417 16.428
Charleston 9.500 13.786 16.657
Norfolk 10.667 14.260 15.900
Philadelphia 0 13.833 12.750
Gulf
Baton Rouge 0 37.500 22,988
Brovmsville 0 22.000 22.879
Corpus Christi 0 0 17,375
Destrehan 0 24.875 31,000
Galveston 13.700 18.428 20.500
Houston 14.500 7,593 39.000
Mobile 12.200 0 26.700
New Orleans 15.000 18.745 17,936
Pascagoula 0 36.667 35.800
Beaumont 0 28.500 0
North Pacific
Long Beach 0 25.188 21.137
Stockton 0 23.000 24,333
Sacramento 0 0 15.000
San Francisco 12.000 0 24,000
Portland 9.500 0 0
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Albany 9.0-19.0° 8.5-15.0 24.0
Baltimore 3.5-14.0 14.5-42.0 9.5-21.0
Charleston 9.5 10.5-17.5 5.0-23.0






Brownsville — 21.0-23.0 14.3-32.0
Corpus Christi — __ 10.0-23.5
Destrehan 15.0-40.0 13.0-32.0
Galveston 9.5-20.0 7.0-30.0 21.0-33.0
Houston 14.5 4.0-14.0 17.5-44.0
Mobile 12.2 3.1-47.0
New Orleans 15.0 11.3-40.0 3.5-34.0
Pascagoula - 32.0-42.0 20.0-46.0
North Pacific
Long Beach 15.0-33.0 10,0-30.0
Portland 9.5
Sacramento _ 15.0
San Francisco 9.5-14.0 24.0
Stockton
— 23.0 24.0-25.0
^All amounts are in thousands of long tons-
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
^Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
'Maritime Research, Inc. (15).
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Chile - 10.0-26.0^ 10.0-16.0^
Peru 5.0-15,0^ 5.0-20.0 5.0-19.0
Brazil 3,0-20.0 10.0-30.0 3.1-41.0
Venezuela 9.5-17.0 5.0-13.1 2.6-14.2
Haiti
- 7.0-11.9 7.1-13.8
Philippines - 11.0-24.0 10.0-27.5
Madras, India
- 20.0-24.0 9,7-33.0
East Coast of India 5.0-15.0 9.2-72.5 10.0-99.5
Bombay, India 4.5-28.0 10.0-34.5 10.0-34.0
West Coast of India 8.5-12.5 5.0-63.0 9.5-33.0
Japan 7.0-19.0 8.0-32.5 12.0-34.0
Union of South Africa
- 14.0-25.0 14.0-17.0
Norway 8.4-9.5 13.0-25.0 13.0-25.0
Italy 5.0-10.0 8.7-30.0 4.0-21.5
Hamburg 9.5-35.0 9.0-60.0 6.5-31.5
Antwerp 8.5-37.0 9.0-38.0 9.0-50.0
Rotterdam 9.0-23.0 8.5-60.0 9.8-51.0
Antwerp, Rotterdam,
or Amsterdam 13.5-22.5 6.0-55.0 9.8-42.0
United Kingdom 5.5-16.5 3.4-18.5 4.2-23.0
0
All amounts are in thousands of long tons.
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
Sdaritime Research, Inc. (18).
Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
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From Table 10 the average size of the shipments originat
ing from a specific United States port can be evaluated.
Since size of shipments has an effect on cost, there
should be a correlation between the smallest average ship
ment size and high rates. If this were true, Chicago,
Philadelphia# Corpus Christi, New Orleans, and Sacramento
should be the high cost ports for their respective ranges.
The average size of shipments of heavy grains may be
misleading in terms of actual shipment size. Table 11 con
tains the size range of shipments for specific origin ports.
Table 12 contains the same information for the selected
destinations.
Voyage Charters
A voyage charter is made for a certain voyage or series
of voyages. Each charter is an unique agreement with its
own terms and provisions, such as who pays for the unload
ing, who pays the port charges, how many days are allowed
for loading or unloading, what port or port range to load
or unload, just to mention a few. In the following two
sectors, two areas of a voyage charter will be surveyed
with the areas being the importance of specific port char
ters and the charges associated with certain charter options.
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Specific port charters 
From Table 13 it should be noted that the naming of 
specific ports of loading was more prevalent in some trade 
routes than in others . Of the heavy grain e xports destined 
for Hamburg , 60.563, 25 . 972 , and 29 . 472 percent for 1958, 
1966 , and 1967, respectively, were so destined aboard ves -
sels employed under voyage charter which named the specific 
port of loading . For Italy , 9 . 865 , 16.271, and 7 .79 2 per-
cent for the same three years were shipped under the same 
type charter. Of Antwerp 1 s total imports of heavy grain 
from the United States , 3 .046 , 13.996, and 14.900 percent 
for the same three years were shipped via the same type 
charter . Of the heavy grain exports destined for Rotterdam, 
40 . 758 , 14 . 876 , and 22 .878 percent for 1958 , 1966 , and 1967 , 
respectively, were shipped via charters naming the specific 
port of loading. For the United Kingdom, 6 . 096, 33 . 145, and 
15 . 676 percent were so shipped . 
Only two non-European destinations showed an appreciable 
amount of United States heavy grain imports origin ating from 
a named port of loading . The two countries, Venezuela and 
Japan, had 0 . 0, 14 . 035 , 19.179, and 2 . 791, 9 . 058 , 5.751 per-
cent for the three years, respectively . 
The rationaJefor the presence of charters naming ~he 
specific port of loading in one trade route and not in anoth er 
is not known. A logical r eason may be that in the trades 
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Table 13. Percentage of United States heavy grain imports
shipped via voyage charters naming the specific




Chile 0^ 0^ 29.268^
Peru 0 5.787 0
Venezuela 0 14-035 19.179
Haiti 0 0 0
Philippines 0 0 0
Madras, India 0 0 0
Union of South Africa 0 5.352 25.000
Hamburg 60.563 25.972 29.472
Norway 0 21.212 0
Italy 9.865 16.271 7.792
Antwerp 3.046 13.996 14.900
Rotterdam 40.758 14.876 22,878
East Coai^t of India 2.418 0 0
United Kingdom 6.096 33.145 15.676
Brazil 8.609 2.184 0.985
Antwerp, Rotterdam,
Amsterdam 0 5.621 11.343
West Coast of India 3.127 0.422 3-421
Japan 2.791 9.058 5.751
Bombay, India 2.203 1-173 1.937
Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
b
Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
'Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
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where it was used the most, the majority of the heavy grain
was shipped by private firms. Private firms have facilities in
only certain ports of loading, therefore, the use of a voyage charter
naming the specific port of loading may be advantageous.
For the trade routes where voyage charters naming the
specific port of loading were absent, at least part of the
heavy grain shipped was under government programs. Grain
exported under government programs may originate from a
variety of sources—government storage, private firms,
direct from the harvest field; thus, the source of a par
ticular shipload of heavy grain may not be known at the time
the vessel is chartered with the result being the naming of
the range loading area. The specific port of loading is
named later as the availability of grain and facilities is
determined.
From Table 14 note the importance of the port charter
for the four port regions of the United States. The Great
Lakes and the North Range exported roughly 25 percent of
their total heavy grain escorts via such chartered vessels.
The percentage shipped as such was much lower for the Gulf
and North Pacific. The overall trend seems to indicate an
increase in the use of specific port charters.
The reason for the difference of importance of voyage
charters naming specific ports of loading for the different







A comparison of the percentage of United States
heavy grain exports shipped via voyage charters
stating the specific port of loading and those
charters stating the region of loading for the














22.169 1.751 2.687 5.114
77-831 98.249 97.313 94.886
1966
Specific port ,
of loading 39.553° 23-222 3.530 11.315 9.098
Regional loading 60.553 76.778 96.469 88.684 90.901
1967
Specific port
of loading 23.606^ 28.403 7.067 7.570 10.301
Regional loading 76.393 71.597 92.932 92.430 89.698
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
'Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
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justification for the naming of a specific port in the
Great Lakes was the additional expense incurred in reaching
one port as compared to another. This would appear to be
true due to the shape of the Great Lakes and the location
of the important ports.
Some of the North Range ports, due to their geographic
location and population, appear to be more susceptible to
congestion than other ports. Congestion leads to more days
in port, thus more expense for the shipowner. This additional
expense will result in higher freight rates for the more
congested ports. Also, heavy grain exports from both port
regions are done mainly by private firms. As private firms
may have facilities in certain ports# the result may be a
specific port charter.
Analysis of charter options
In addition to the usual provisions, many charters
carry options such as load two ports, deliver two ports,
load or deliver alternate ports or ranges. The costs
associated with these alternatives would seem to be an ex
cellent source of some of the basic cost relationships
present in the ocean shipping industry. These costs are
presented in Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 summarizes the
options that were available to some charterers at the time
of loading. Table 16 summarizes the options that were avail
able for at least one charterer at the destinations.
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Destination Cost of options
United Kingdom Load Lake Eire - $-35 extra,




Load Toledo - $.50 less, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load Toledo - $1.05 less, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.







Load Gulf - $1.25 to $.68
extra, via American Flag Ves
sels. $.35 extra via Foreign
Flag Vessels.
Load Gulf - $1,50 extra, via
American Flag Vessels.
Load Albany, New York - $.35
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels .
Load Albany, New York - $-35
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels.
Load Gulf - $.35 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels-
Load New York City - $.35 extra
via Foreign Falg Vessels.
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16, 17, 18).








Destination Cost of options
United Kingdom Load Gulf - $-42 to $-63 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load Albany - $.18 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Santos, Brazil Load Albany - $-50 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Rotterdam Load Gulf - $.95 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.











Load North Range - $-28 to $-35
less, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load North Pacific - $.35 less,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load North Range - $-25 to $.53
less, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load two ports - $.35 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load North Range - $.50 to $.75
less, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load North Range - $.25 less,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load Baton Rouge - $.18 less,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Load North Range - $-56 to $.81
less, via Foreign Flag Vessels.




Origin of a_ •
shipment Destination Cost of options
Destrehan Hamburg Load two ports - $.25 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
North Pacific India's East
Coast
Load San Francisco - $.70 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Rotterdam Load San Francisco - $.25 to
$.50 extra, via Foreign Flag
Vessels.
Load Stockton — $.25 to $.50
extra, via Foreign Flag
Vessels.
Table 16. Costs of options
tion^
available to charters at destina-
Country of Origin of
destination shipment Cost of options
Japan North Pacific
Gulf
Bombay, India North Range
Delivery to Hadadate, Hokkaido,
or Otaru were from 25(? to 50(?^
higher than delivery to other
Japanese ports.
Delivery to Calcutta - $5-95
to $9.95 extra, via American
Flag Ships.
Delivery to Madras - $.75 to
$2.45 extra, via American
Flag Ships.
Maritime Research, Inc. (16, 17, 18).

















Delivery to Madras - $1.48 to
$2.00 extra, via American Flag
Vessels.
Delivery to Madras - $.70 less,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Free Delivery, $1.05 less than
Gross Terms.
Delivery to Calcutta via
lighterage - $5.00 to $5.50
extra, via American Flag Ves
sels .
Delivery via Cape - $3-00 to
$5.00 extra, via American
Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Madras - $.35 less,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Calcutta via
lighterage - $4.00 extra via
American Flag Vessels.
Delivery to India's East Coast -
$2.50 extra, via American Flag
Vessels. $.35 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Madras - $2.60
extra, via American Flag Ves
sels .
Delivery to India's East Coast -
$.35 extra, via Foreign Flag
Vessels. $1.60 extra, via
American Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Madras - $.35 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Free Delivery, $1.05 less than
Gross Terms Delivery,
Delivery via Cape - $1.96 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Calcutta - $.14























Delivery to India's West
Coast - $.35 extra# via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Kandla - $.35
extra, via Foreign Flag
Vessels-
Delivery to Bombay - $3.25
less, via American Flag
Vessels.
Delivery to Bombay or Kandla
- $5.97 less, via American
Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Birkenhead - $.70
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels.
Delivery to the West Coast of
the United Kingdom - $.35 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to the East Coast of
the United Kingdom - $.35 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Hull - $.18 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Mersey, Hull, or
Liverpool - $.18 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Mersey - $.21 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Hull - $.18 extra,



















Delivery to Hull - $.35 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Avonmouth or Glas
gow - $.18 extra, via Foreign
Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Manchester - $.18
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels.
Delivery to Liverpool - $.07
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels .
Delivery to Birkenhead - $.07
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels.
Delivery to Belfast - $.0
extra, via Foreign Flag Ves
sels.
Delivery to Hull - $.14 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels,
Delivery to Mersey - from
$.18 to $.28 extra, via
Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Hull - $.35 extra,
via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to London - $.35 ex
tra, via Foreign Flag Vessels.
Delivery to Liverpool - $.18
extra, via Foreign Flag Vessels
Delivery to Hamburg- $.25 extra.
Delivery to Antwerp-$.10 to
$.15 extra.
Delivery to Germany-$.25 extra,
'Great Lakes, North Range, Gulf, and North Pacific.
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Freight Rates for Heavy Grain
Tramp shipping of United States heavy grain under voy
age charter was divided into two distinct markets, the United
States-flag vessels and foreign-flag vessels- The rates
charged by the United States-flag vessels were so much higher
than the foreign-flag rates that there was no competition be
tween the two sectors. The United States-flag vessels com
pete with each other for 50 percent of the Government-spon
sored cargoes guaranteed to them by the Cargo Preference Act
of 1954 (25), The foreign-flag vessels compete for the re
maining 50 percent of Government-sponsored cargoes and the
private sectors.
One study (8) available was concerned with the sta
tistical analysis of ocean freight rates for heavy grains
shipped via voyage chartered tramp vessels. The study covers
the years 1961-1965. It excludes the lighter grains; oats,
barley, and rye^ because of their erratic movement and sig-
nificantly higher rates per ton would have caused excessive
fluctuations of the data (8). It also excludes fixtures
reported for cargoes of less than 5,000 long tons.
Since data was not available on a port—to—port basis,
both origin and destination ports included were arranged
into groupings commonly used by the shipping industry. Quo
tations were sorted by the origin-destination couplets, or
"trades", and further sorted to segregate United States
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registry ships in those trades where they were found (8).
The rate shown in each quotation for a trade was
weighted by the tonnage associated with that rate and ag
gregated on a quarterly basis to form a weighted average.
Whenever the quotation allowed for a range in tonnage, the
lowest tonnage shown was used. The quantities shown moving
by tramp ships were, therefore, understated possibly by 5
to 10 percent.^ When quotations used^provided for optional
origins or destinations, optional rates were aggregated with
principal rates to calculate the average rates (8).
Hutchinson (8), by the use of linear regression to com
pare the changes in freight rates for each trade route with
the changes in rates of every other trade route, concluded
that rates of United States-flag vessels operate independently
of each other and the market for foreign-flag vessels. The
rates for foreign-flag vessels were found to be somewhat
interdependent with the rates for United States Gulf origi
nating trades. He also found, except for the United States
Gulf to North Africa trade, that rates for the trades orig
inating in the Gulf were related to each other and to the
rates associated with trades originating at other United
States ports. Rates to the United Kingdom from North At
lantic ports were also related to similar rates from the
The range allowed in most quotations is ur»ually 5 per
cent, such as 10,000-5%, which means the shipper can ship any
where from 9,500 long tons to 10,500 long tons. Hutchinson
(8) always chose the lower tonnage.
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Gulf.
Rates in the foreign-flag market showed sharp absolute
fluctuations as well as greater variations than those found
in the United States—flag rates. The relative stability of
United States-flag rates were probably caused by statuatory
limitations placed upon the ocean shipping rates which may
be paid from concessional sales (8).
Fluctuations of ocean freight rates for heavy grains
are a result of numerous and complex factors. Many of the
factors influencing the supply and demand were international
in origin. Three such factors seem to play a very important
role# those being political, economic, and military events.
The comparison of a short list of such events to the monthly
highs and lows of freight rates for ten years will show the
influence. The comparison plus an analysis of weighted
monthly average and yearly means of ocean freight rates
will complete the section.
Freight rate fluctuations and world events
The list of world events below, although incomplete,
represents the major events that have happened in the ten
year period. The two trade routes used were; North Pacific
to Japan, and the Gulf to Antwerp or Rotterdam. The monthly
lows and highs for ten years of freight rates for the two
trade routes were plotted in Figure 1.
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The economic and political events considered are ( 3 ):
1957 March 27; Reopening of the Suez Canal for passage of
ships of 10,000 tons dead weight.
1958 July 14; Revolt in Iraq, followed by British and
American landings in Jordan and Lebanon.
1959 April 25; St. Lawrence Seaway opened.
1960 December; Reports of famine conditions in China.
1961 January; Beginning of large-scale imports of grain
and fertilizers by Communist China.
1962 September- Build-up and withdrawal of Russian missiles
October; from Cuba,
1963 August- Russian purchase of Canadian and Australian
September; grain.
1963 October; Russian negotiations for American grain.
Freight market booms.
TanXer tonnage of over a million turned to
grain trading.
August; Famine in India. A million tons of shipping
chartered for movement of United States grain
to India.
October; Change of government in United Kingdom.
Change of government in U.S.S.R.
Escalation of the Vietnam War causes the
United States government to step-up charter





September; India-PaXistan conflict over Kashmir. War
risk insurance rates applied.
October; Reports of poor grain crops in Eastern Canada
and Eastern Australia.
December; Drought reports in Central Africa.
1966 May; British seamen strike for 40 days.
From Figure 1 the influence the list of events had on
each trade route can be evaluated. As readily seen, with
the reopening of the Suez Canal in March of 1957, freight
rates tumbled to a level where December rates were one-third
the value of rates present earlier in the year. Rates re
mained relatively stable until July, 1958, when a revolt in
Iraq, followed by British and American landings in Jordan
and Lebanon, disrupted their stability. The Gulf to Antwerp
or Rotterdam rate rose, but the Middle East conflict did not
influence the North Range to Japan rate appreciable. The
"memories" of the previous closing of the Suez Canal and sub
sequent high freight rates may have caused many firms to
over react and charter an excess amount of tonnage with the
results being an enlarged demand.
On April 25, 1958, the St- Lawrence Seaway opened. A
drop in the rate for both trade routes occurred. December,
1960, reports of famine conditions in China resulted in
large-scale imports of grain and fertilizer in January, 1961.
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The results were that the freight rate from the North Pacific
to Japan held at a higher level with less variation than
previous years. There appeared to be no effect on the Gulf
rate.
The build-up and withdrawal of Russian missiles from
Cuba in September-October^ 1962/ may have caused the rates
for both trade routes to increase# but it was impossible to
determine if the missile build-up or seasonal variation
caused the increase.
In August-September of 1963, Russia purchased Canadian
and Australian grain. In October, the Russians completed
negotiations for American grain. Rates for both trade routes
increased significantly with the Gulf to Antwerp or Rotter
dam rate showing the largest increase.
In March, 1964, tanker tonnage of over a million tons
turned to the grain trade. The Japanese rate was not effected
because tankers were not employed in the trade to Japan. The
rate to Antwerp decreased for the next four months-
A famine in India in August of 1964 resulted in the
shipping of over a million tons of United States grain to
India. Most of the grain shipped to India originated from
either the Gulf or the North Pacific, the result was that
the rate for both trades were affected.
The most important event in 1965 was the escalation of
the Vietnam war which resulted in increased chartering of
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foreign-flag vessels to supplement the U.S. tonnage. Rates
for both trade routes stayed above normal throughout the
entire year.
For 1967, the freight rates for both trade routes de
creased from the 1966 level. The rate difference between
the two trades which became quite evident in 1965 continued
to exist in 1967.
Freight rates for heavy grains were subject to many
fluctuations as was evident for the ten year period. The
partial list of world events accounted for some of the
fluctuations, but not for all. Variations within a month
were also unaccounted for.
Analysis of freight rates
Since data was limited on a port-to—port basis, it was
necessary to group the freight rates for heavy grains into
ranges. Even with the grouping of the rates into ranges,
most trade routes had none or too few fixtures to indicate
the relative monthly rate level associated with the trade
routs.
Appendix A contains for a select few trade routes the
derived monthly weighted averages of the ocean freight rates
for heavy grains shipped via voyage chartered tramp vessels
for 1958, 1966, and 1967. The number of monthly averages
for many trade routes were too few in number to provide the
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basis for a conclusion.^ The averages for all trade routes
showed a great variation.
Each charter agreement has its own unique provisions,
therefore, it was necessary to make several assumptions to
enable the aggregation of the rates. The assumption of no
multiple deliveries or loadings is still in effect. The
adjustment of the rates associated with multiple port load
ing or unloading were required. Charges for multiple port
loading were taken from Table 15. Charges for multiple port
deliveries are listed in Table 17- The charges for multiple
port loadings or deliveries were subtracted from the freight
rates where it was applicable.
It was also necessary to convert all rates to a free
delivery basis. Charges for the conversion of free-in and
out terms to free delivery terms are listed in Table 18.
These charges were derived from the stevedore rates listed
in Table 19. To convert free-in and out to free delivery
it was necessary to add the charges to the free-in and out
rates.
The conversion of gross terms to free delivery was ac
complished by the subtraction of charges listed in Table 16.
The conversion in the Indian and Antwerp trades were accom
plished by the subtraction of the amount $1.05 (16, 11, 18).
There were no shipments of heavy grains in our sample
for 1958 to Chile, Haiti, Madras, Union of South Africa, and
the Philippines.
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Foreign- United Foreign- United Foreign- United
flag States- flag States- flag States-




Brazil 25 25 50 25
Venezuela 25 25 25
Haiti 25 25
Philippines 25 25 25
Madras 35 35 35 50 35
East Coast of
India 35 35 35 50 35
Bombay 35 35 35 50 35
West Coast of
India 35 35 35 50 35
Japan 25 20 20
Union of South
Africa 25 30 30
Norway- 25 25 25
Italy 25 25 25
Hamburg 25 25 25 25
Antwerp 25 25 25
Rotterdam 25 25 25
Antwerp, Rotter
dam, or Amster
dam 25 25 25
United Kingdom 35 35 35
50
Charges represent the modal value associated with char
ters for that particular trade.
^In cents per long ton.
'Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
Writime Research, Inc. (17).
'Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
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Table 18. Derived stevedore rates for heavy grains for the
four port regions
Type of vessel Great Lakes North Range Gulf North Range
Non-tanker^ $.33^ ,41 $.28 $. 47
Tanker^ $.52 ,65 $.30 $. 60
Non-tanker rates are derived from Table 19. The method
was to find the average for the bulk carrier and the tween
deck vessel for each port region and to then use the average
of these two numbers. The numbers were rounded to the nearest
whole cent.
All charges are per long ton.
^Finlayson# John. Cooke and Company, Grain Division,
Memphis, Tenn. Data on stevedore rates. Private communica
tion. 1969.
Table 19. Stevedore rates for heavy grains for the four
port regions^
Type of vessel Great Lakes North Range Gulf North Range
Bulk Carrier
Self-trimming $.14^ $.30 $.15 $.25
Non-self-trimming $.28 $.30 $.15 $.45
Tween Deck
Two decks $.40 $.52 $.40 $.56
Three decks $.50 $.52 $.62
Tanker $.52 $.65 $.30 $.60
Finlayson, John. Cooke and Company, Grain Division,
Memphis, Tenn. Data on stevedore" rates. Private communi
cation. 1969.
All charges are per long ton.
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An amount of $3.20 (16, 17, 18) was used to adjust the rates
in the trade routes to the United Kingdom.^ Thompson (24)
states that labor costs for unloading in the United Kingdom
are approximately 2-1/2 times those at Rotterdam. It ap
pears that our estimate may be a little high as although
Rotterdam's charge for unloading was unknown, it should be
lower or equal to Antwerp's.
With the blockage of the Suez Canal on June 6, 1967,
it became necessary for vessels engaged in the trade to
India to navigate around the tip of South Africa. All rates
quoted after this data for shipments to Bombay or the West
Coast of India, originating from the Gulf, North Range, or
the Great Lakes were assessed an additional charge of $1.96
for foreign-flag vessels (16, 17, 18). All United States
flag-vessels engaged in the same trade were assessed the
charge quoted in an option that was available for all fix
tures reported. This charge usually ranged from $4 to $6
(16, 17, 18).
Freight rates for 1958, although quite variable, remained
at relatively the same level for all trade routes throughout
the year. For 1966, freight rates declined from the highs
recorded in the first few months of the year to lows for the
These charges were obtained by the pairing of similar
fixtures, one with free delivery and one with gross terms.
The charges are the mean of these differences.
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year in December, The freight rates remained at this level
until the Suez Canal closed on the 6th of June. This event
immediately raised all rates, but the increase in rates was
more gradual for trade routes not directly involved.
The presence of certain vessel types and flags was
quite apparent. In the Indian trade, tankers and United
States-flag vessels were more active in the shipments to
Bombay than for shipments to the West Coast of India. The
bulk of the shipments to the West Coast of India were aboard
foreign-flag non-tankers, whereas the bulk of the shipments
to Bombay was aboard foreign-flag tankers and United States-
flag tankers and non-tankers.
There were also differences in the origin of the ship
ments to Bombay and the West Coast of India. Shipments to
the West Coast of India originating from the North Pacific
were non-existent, whereas there were shipments originating
from the North Pacific to Bombay,
The bulk of the shipments to Japan originated from the
Gulf and the North Pacific ranges. Except for 1958, all
shipments to Japan were via foreign-flag non-tankers.
It was also quite apparent that the North Range and the
Great Lakes range were in competition for shipments to
Rotterdam, the United Kingdom, and A.R.A.^ This was apparent
^Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Amsterdam.
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by an analysis of the absence and presence of the weighted
monthly averages in the three trades. There was an absence
of weighted monthly averages for the North Range during the
months the Great Lakes were in operation, especially in the
months June, July, and August. The presence of freight
rates for the North Range for the months the Seaway was
closed indicates that shippers utilize the North Range when
the Seaway is under ice. It appears that the Great Lakes
holds a competitive advantage over the North Range, and
shippers were aware of it and took advantage of it by using
the Seaway when it was in operation, then switching to the
North Range when the Seaway was closed.
There exists great variation in the weighted monthly
averages, the variations combined with few observation
greatly limited the possible conclusions. The yearly means
in Appendix B give a better view of the differences that
exist between the types of vessel, the flag of the vessel,
and the export range.
The differences in the freight rates between ranges of
export should reflect the differences in stevedoring costs,
the differences in distances to the destinations, and dif
ferences in the time needed to load the vessel. Table 20
lists the average number of days spent in port loading,
which influence loading costs by requiring a certain num
ber of lay days.
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Differences in costs of unloading a tanker as compared
to a non-tanker may account for part of the difference be
tween the tanker and non-tanker rate. The freight rate
difference for different type vessels seems to be smaller
for American vessels than for foreign-flag vessels.
Differences in the rates for foreign-flag versus United
States-flag were enormous. It was apparent that the foreign-
flag vessels and United States-flag vessels were not in com
petition for the same cargoes.
Even with yearly means, the data was sparce. One of
the more interesting observations was in the trades to Ham
burg, Antwerp/ and Rotterdam. It appears that Hamburg was
the high cost port, with Antwerp next, and finally Rotterdam
having the lowest rate of the three. But the most interest
ing observation was that the rates for shipments destined
for Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Amsterdam (A.R.A.), had the
lowest rate structure of all routes to northern Europe.
The reason Hamburg was the high cost port may be partly
explained by the larger number of days spent unloading as
compared to the other destinations. The average number of
days spend in port unloading is presented in Table 21.
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^"X" means that this vessel cannot be loaded because of
draft restrictions.
^inlayson, John- Cooke and Company, Grain Division,
Memphis, Tehn- Data on days in port. Private Communication.
1969.
"Y" means that information for days in port for that
size vessel was not available.
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Table 21* Average number of days spent in port unloading
Port of Size of vessel
Destination






Venezuela 13^ 25 X
Haiti 25 50
Philippines 15^ 25 50
Madras, India Y Y
East Coast of Vv
India X X






Union of South "U
Africa 10 X
Norway 10 X




Antwerp ^e 4 4
Rotterdam 4 4
Antwerp, Rotterdam
or Amsterdam 4 4
United Kingdom 7^ 10 X
^ead weight tons.
Davis, LeRoy (4).
"X" means that this vessel cannot be loaded because of
draft restrictions.
"Y" means that information for days in port for that
size vessel was not available.
e„.
'Finlayson, John. Cooke and Company, Grain Division,





It was apparent that there were two separate markets
for voyage chartered tramp vessels# one for foreign-flag
vessels, and one for United States-flag vessels, "The rate
difference makes it apparent that the two flags were not in
competition with each other, otherwise the rates would be
more equal.
One market consists of the United States-flag vessels
competing for that portion of Government-sponsored heavy
grain exports guaranteed them under the Cargo Preference
Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832).
Foreign-flag ves.sels competing for the private sector
shipments and the remaining portion of the Government-spon
sored shipments make up the second market. Rate fluctua
tions in this market were common with the variations being
quite large. Rates in the United States-flag sector were
much less subject to fluctuation.
Rate differences between tankers and non-tankers also
exist. The difference should reflect the extra costs which
the shipper must bear for the unloading of the tanker as
compared to a non-tanker.
Rates differentials also could be the result of a ship
per's purchase of additional services. Among the additional
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services or options available were? load or deliver at two
ports, load or deliver at a range port other than the one
chartered/ free delivery, gross terms, free-in and out, just
to mention a few of the more frequently used options.
The influence on freight rates the naming of a specific
port of loading or unloading will depend on the advantage or
disadvantage in costs associated with the port. The naming
of a specific port of loading or unloading has become more
common in the past ten years. It appears that the trend of
increased popularity of specific port charter will continue
because increased congestion of certain ports is inevitable.
The relative importance of the United States-flag tramp
also will change. The United States-flag tramp, whose liveli
hood depends on Government-sponsored shipments, will continue
to operate only if Government-sponsored shipments continue.
It is inevitable that the United States tramps will lose some
of its share of the market to United States-flag liners, un
less the tramp owners begin to replace the current tramp
fleet which is of World War II vintage, and has surpassed the
vessel's expected life, with the scrapping of many within the
next few years.
The relative importance of the various export ranges
should change in the future. The practice of not using the
North Range when the St. Lawrence Seaway is open should con
tinue, The future importance of the Great Lakes is uncertain.
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With the advent of larger and larger vessels and the cur
rent limitation on size under the present loclc system and
its associated congestion, it appears that unless the lock
system is enlarged to handle larger vessels and at a faster
rate, the future use of the Great Lakes will be limited.
The Gulf region, with continued favorable railroad
and barge rates and ever improving facilities, should con
tinue to handle the major share of the heavy grain exports.
The North Pacific will not greatly increase its relative
share of the heavy grain exports until more favorable rail
road rates are enacted from the grain producing areas of
the country.
Recommendations for Further Study
This study was a comprehensive exploratory study into
the ocean shipping of heavy grain. Any aspect of it could
be enlarged upon to form numerous separate studies.
A study involving any one aspect of the United States
merchant marine would be a fine beginning. Among the many
possibilities are; its subsidy programs, labor union's in
fluence, shipbuilding costs, operating costs and technolog
ical improvements. Such studies should have as their pri
mary objective the improving of the United States fleet so
it could compete effectively with foreign-flag vessels.
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An analysis into the factors that cause the levels of
demand and supply to fluctuate also would be of interest.
There is the possibility of formulating plans or policies
for international regulation of such factors. A similar
analysis could be made into the possibility of regulating
ocean freight rates for bulX commodities shipped on tramp
vessels.
The results of the present study on costs and rates
have suffered immensely from lack of available data. An
expanded study, with the cooperation of private grain ex
porters, into the variations of costs associated with respect
to loading and unloading of heavy grain in all major grain
handling ports of the world, would be of interest to all ex
porters. This analysis could easily be expanded to investi
gate the rate differential between different ports.
An attempt at forecasting changes needed to enable
United States ports to handle future grain shipments would
be of interest. An analysis into the feasibility of
prescheduling future grain shipments in conjunction with
the regulation of the supply of vessels and its influence
on stabilization of freight rates would also be of interest.
The results of any of the above studies could be in
corporated into an over-all plan enabling a producer of grain
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APPENDIX A. 1958, 1966, AND 1967 MONTHLY
WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF FREIGHT RATES FOR HEAVY
GRAINS SHIPPED VIA TRAMP VESSELS
Table 22. Bombay, India: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via














































22.48 19.08 24.50 24.50 16.95
12.95 15.20 16.79 17.71 15.95
Table 23. Bombay, India: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via













































^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
29.02
27.25







June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
9-39^ 11.90 12.00 8.75
8.75 8.28 7.92 8.82 9.03 9.93 10.13
6.30
21.00 22.00 26.00 27.89
28.25 27.71 27.00 29.72 29.70
27.75 26.25 28.75
25.75
21.00 26.71 27.94 27.69
24.65 30.27 28.27 28.55 29.64 29.74
25.44 26.24 25.75 29.12 29.00
Table 24. Bombay/ India: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via













































































Table 25, West Coast of India: monthly weighted averages
of freight rates for heavy grains shipped via
















































7.68 10.85 8.75 9.45
Table 26. West Coast of India: monthly weighted averages
of freight rates for havey grains shipped via





























































29.70 30.59 29.50 29.74
Table 27. West Coast of India: monthly weighted averages
of freight rates for heavy grains shipped via





















































18.06 18.03 18.24 18.55 18.55 18.12
28.38
33.24
Table 28, Japan: monthly weighted averages of freight

















































June July Aug Sept, Oct. Nov- Dec.
8.75
8.25 8.24 8,01 8.14 8.70 8.63
5.96 5.19 4.97 4.66 5.43 5.78
12.00 8.00
Table 29. Japan: monthly weighted averages of freight


































































Table 30. Japan: monthly weighted averages of freight








































^Maritime Research, Inc» (18).
^All rates in dollars per long ton.
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Table 31, Rotterdam: monthly weighted averages of freight












































Table 32. Rotterdam: monthly weighted averages of freight







































































Table 33. Rotterdam: monthly weighted averages of freight































Maritime Research, Inc. (18).
























Table 34, Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Amsterdam: monthly
weighted averages of freight rates for heavy








































Table 35. Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Amsterdam: monthly
weighted averages of freight rates for heavy














































June July Aug, Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
8.17 7.68 7.36 7.13 7.74 8.09
3.00
3.39 3.77 3.43 3.44 3.84 4-13 3.80
3.33 3.18 3.55
Table 36, Antwerp, Rotterdam/ or Amsterdam; monthly
weighted averages of freight rates for heavy












































June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
8.25 8.55 7.70 7.96 9.46 8.93
4.16 5.66
3-30 4.30 4.68 5.46 5.53 5.40 5.70
Table 37. United Kingdom: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via























































Table 38- United Kingdom: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via



















































6.43 6.47 5.69 5.33 5.96 6.09
Table 39. United Kingdom: monthly weighted averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via





























































APPENDIX B. 1958, 1966, AND 1967 YEARLY MEANS
OF THE WEIGHTED MONTHLY AVERAGES OF FREIGHT
RATES FOR HEAVY GRAINS SHIPPED VIA TRAMP VESSELS
Table 40. Yearly means of the weighted monthly averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via tramp



































®A11 rates in dollars per long ton
Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16).

































Table 41. Yearly means of the weighted monthly averages of
f^^si^l^t rates for heavy grains shipped via tramp






























All rates in dollars per long ton,
^Maritime Research, Inc. (16).
^Maritime Research, Inc. (17).














































Table 42. Yearly means of the weighted monthly averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via tramp












15.0^^Great Lakes 20 .65^
North Range 16 ,11'^ V. 8.93° 12.85 13 .42
Gulf 8 .23 10.54^ 15.94^ 9.48 13.38 15 .82
North Pacific 7 .63 10.22 11.52
Tanker
Great Lakes
North Range 8 .05 9.57 7.43
Gulf 9.29 8.80 11.61 9 .29




North Range 20 .68 25.36 27.29 27.10 28 .00
Gulf 20 .64 28.49 30.85 29.88




Gulf 28.43 31.16 33 .24
North Pacific 27.29 28.15
All rates in dollars per long ton.
Maritime Research, Inc. (17).
'Maritime Research, Inc. (18).

























Table 43. Yearly means of the weighted monthly averages of
freight rates for heavy grains shipped via tramp




































All rates in dollars per long ton.
Maritime Research, Inc. (17)•
Maritime Research, Inc. (18).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX C. CARGO PREFERENCE ACT
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CARGO PREFERENCE ACT OF 1954
(68 Stat. 832)
Public Law 664 Chapter 936
An Act
To amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to provide per
manent legislation for the transportation of a substantial
portion of waterborne cargoes in United States-flag vessels.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representa
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
that section 901 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended,
is hereby amended by inserting "a" after "Sec. 901." and by
adding at the end of the section the following new subsection:
"(b) whenever the United States shall procure, contract for,
or otherwise obtain for its own account, or shall furnish to
or for the account of any foreign nation without provision for
reimbursement, any equipment, materials, or commodities, with
in or without the United States, or shall advance funds or
credits or guarantee the convertibility of foreign currencies
in connection with the furnishing of such equipment, materi
als, or commodities, the appropriate agency or agencies shall
take such steps as may be necessary and practicable to assure
that at least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of such
equifxnent, materials, or commodities (computed separately for
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dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners, and tankers), which may
be transported on ocean vessels shall be transported on
privately owned United States-flag commercial vessels, to the
extent such vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates
for United States-flag commercial vessels, in such manner as
will insure a fair and reasonable participation of United
States-flag commercial vessels in such cargoes by geographic
areas; Provided, That the provisions of this subsection may
be waived whenever the Congress by concurrent resolution or
otherwise, or the President of the United States or the Sec
retary of Defense declares that an emergency exists justify
ing a temporary waiver of the provisions of section 901 (b)
and so notifies the appropriate private agency or agencies:
and provided further. That the provisions of this subsection
shall not apply to cargoes carried in the vessels of the
Panama Canal Company. Nothing herein shall repeal or other
wise modify the provisions of Public Resolution Numbered 17,
Seventy-third Congress (48 Stat. 500), as amended."
Approved August 26, 1954.
